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The inclusion of Aphra Behn in Anthony Collins’ 1713 Discourse of Free-
Thinking as the only female in a list of respected libertine thinkers calls into question 
traditional readings of Behn as solely a sexual libertine. While she certainly engages in 
controversial sexual and gendered philosophy, Collins considers her a part of a more 
broadly defined freethinking community of theological and classical inquiry. When 
Collins lists Behn in a sampling of writers that celebrated Thomas Creech’s 1683 
translation of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, she joins the ranks of men such as Dr. 
Edward Bernard, Joshua Barnes, and the provost of King’s College, Dr. Adams (Collins 
92). All of these men produced texts of interest for the freethinking community of the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century, from Bernard’s discussions of suicide in 
Donne’s Biathanatos to Barnes’ fictional utopian world of pygmies. Yet Collins does not 
know that Behn was unusually controversial in her treatment of Creech’s Lucretius. Her 
own commendatory poem underwent two editions, one of which was highly edited by 
Creech. Creech’s edits reveal that he was concerned with her celebration of the freedom 
of thought—a freedom that even Behn seems to recognize could lead to complex and 
even problematic theological inquiries.  
Collins draws the reader to recognize Behn as a philosopher of esteem. While the 
other men in this passage are simply listed, Behn is singled out with a longer 
introduction. Collins’ choice to include and favorably memorialize Behn appears 
deliberately shocking but not satirical, as some may assume. In this deeply critical text 
which urges its readers to seriously question religious doctrines, Collins chooses to refer 
to Behn as “the Right Modest and Orthodox Matron” (Collins 92). With this 
Lesley 3 
 
recommendation, Collins reinforces the urgency of re-examining our assumptions about 
the kind of libertine that Behn in fact was. He encourages the reader to consider her not 
just as a sexual libertine or a bawdy playwright, but rather as a respectable member of 
philosophical libertine circles of the seventeenth century.  To invite her into such a 
community would be to overtly label her a freethinker. As I will examine throughout this 
essay, freethinking communities were predicated not on similar strains of thought, but 
rather on the discursive community that challenged dogma and entered debate. The poem 
for which Collins’ recognizes her demonstrates Behn’s desire to develop such a 
community.  
Behn’s inclusion in this list is not to be confined to just her treatment of Lucretius 
and Creech. In at least three other literary works, she exercises her commitment to 
intellectual freedom and collaboration. In Oroonoko, she develops a black enslaved 
protagonist who serves as a mouthpiece for identifying white Christian hypocrisy and 
supporting Epicurean ideals. In her “Essay on Translated Prose”, Behn invokes theories 
of Biblical accommodation and translation in order to defend scientific discoveries that 
challenged theological principles, such as Copernican systems of the universe. Finally, in 
her poem, “A Letter to Mr. Creech”, Behn voices her frustrations that, in spite of her 
publication of varied and astute libertine texts, she was, ultimately, excluded from the 
community of freethinkers because of her gender.  
In developing sense of Behn as a libertine thinker from these sources, one comes 
across three central issues. Firstly, in spite of Behn’s rather liberal philosophical 
discussions, her style of freethought is also closely connected with the politically 
conservative. This conservativism is particularly apparent in Behn’s pro-monarchal 
Lesley 4 
 
poetry and plays. Reconciling how the libertine can also function as a political 
conservative, as in writers such as Behn, Margaret Cavendish, and Thomas Hobbes, is 
imperative to our understanding of Behn as a complex and diverse thinker. In addition, 
though this reading of Behn calls into question essentialist views of her as just as sexual 
freethinker, it is impossible to ignore that, at some level, her libertinism was involved in 
the sexual. The inclusion of the sexual in freethought often existed on a slippery 
spectrum—from the highly desexualized Creech to the Earl of Rochester, who was 
known for writing pornographic poems that exposed hypocrisies in English society. That 
Behn is associated with both of these thinkers and writes rather freely about sex in her 
poems and plays forces us to consider the sexual nature of many of her writings; 
however, it is a disservice to allow the sexual aspect of her work to be prioritized over her 
religious, political, and social concerns. Lastly, it is tempting to assume that because she 
wrote so openly about urgent contemporary philosophical issues, she was fully included 
in the conversation. In reality, she was often overtly excluded. While this essay attempts 
to read her in spite of her gender, one cannot suggest that Behn’s contemporaries did the 
same.  
Before we understand what kind of libertine Behn asserted herself to be, it is 
crucial to outline what kind of freethought Collins accredits to her. In A Discourse of 
Freethinking, Collins provides intellectual historical overviews of the “The Rise and 
Growth of a Sect call’d Free-Thinkers” (Collins i). This overview includes Collins’ 
definition of freethinking, a summary of challenges these communities have faced, and a 
list of libertines whom he admires. In this overview, it is clear that Collins’ brand of 
freethinking is concerned not with the sexual, but rather the theological. The challenges 
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to which Collins refers are frequently in relation to quarrels with the Church of England. 
An example of such is his detailed demonstration of “the Diversity of Opinions of the 
Priests of the Church of England, all pretended to be deduc’d from the Scripture” (61). 
This section comprises, among other things, Collins’ denunciation of Trinitarianism and a 
discussion the diverse reception of Lucretian-Epicurean thought in the English church. 
This is the passage in which Behn is commended not only for her morality, but also for 
her contribution, in her poem to Creech, to the ongoing discussion between the Church 
and seventeenth-century Epicureans.  
Though Collins’ disillusionment with the sanctity of priestly decrees may reveal a 
sincere level of antagonism toward Christianity, he is not, by modern conceptions, 
atheistic or even agnostic. To suggest that he is such is to ignore sections in which he 
argues, through Scriptural evidence, for divinely condoned freethinking. Collins bases 
much of his treatise on the premise that “the general Rules of Free-Thinking, on which 
the Gospel was to be built,…[Jesus] so particularly laid down and inculcated” (Collins 
46). Freethinking, while it may lead to doubt, not only has a Gospel precedent, but, as a 
Scriptural doctrine under Collins’ view, is also the duty of the Christian to practice. 
According to A Discourse of Free-thinking, if the Christians’ goal is to arrive at 
divinely inspired knowledge, free inquiry can only be accessed by the heavenly gift of 
human reasoning. As such, practices of God-breathed rationality cannot be restricted by 
man-made religious doctrine. Under this framework, Collins writes: 
If the surest and best means of arriving at Truth lies in Free-Thinking, then the 
whole Duty of Man with respect to Opinions lies only in Free-Thinking. Because 
he who thinks freely does his best towards being in the right, and consequently 
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does all that God, who can require nothing more of any Man than that he should 
do his best, can require of him. (33)  
This notion of freethinking—permission to question established theological and natural 
philosophical principles from Scriptural evidence—allows for Collins to endorse such 
theories as the Copernican system of the universe and pre-Adamites.1 Collins calls those 
who refuse to recognize the value of such theories “unthinkers” (5). “Unthinkers”, 
according to Collins, are those who wish to restrain public intellectual discourse. Indeed, 
Collins’ definition of free-thinking is clearly expressed at the beginning of the treatise: 
“Free-thinking…[is] the Use of the Understanding, in endeavouring to find out the 
Meaning of any Proposition whatsoever, in considering the nature of the Evidence for or 
against it, and in judging of it according to the seeming Force or Weakness of the 
Evidence” (5). This definition, Collins argues, cannot be deemed theologically 
unacceptable, though it is practiced by few because of religious restrictions.  
For Collins to detail the rise of evidence-based intellectual explorations and 
institute Behn among early freethinkers elicits a reading of her that has been largely 
ignored. Surely, Behn has been studied as a libertine in regards to racial politics in 
Oroonoko and in regards to sexuality and gendered identity in her explicit, but politically 
centered, plays and prose works, such The Rover and her serial novel, Letters Between a 
Nobleman and His Sister. However, such readings, while accurate to some degree, reduce 
Behn to extremes of bawdy playwright or radical sexual thinker. These critical lenses 
                                                          
1 Those who supported the notion of pre-Adamites argued that Adam was not the first 




have isolated her work from her active contribution to seventeenth-century intellectual 
libertinism.  
More often than not, such criticism draws her as exclusively a proto-feminist or 
sexual libertine.2 As contemporary critic Susan Wiseman deduces, Behn’s “reputation for 
sexual freedom—or certainly for writing with freedom about sexual issues…led to a 
decline in her reputation during the eighteenth century” (Wiseman 5).3  This stereotype of 
Behn has ghettoized her and other Restoration women writers, such as Cavendish, in a 
way that rarely allows for dynamic dialogue with their intellectually driven male 
colleagues. Part of the problem with Behn’s reception is that even the immediate, early 
eighteenth-century criticism of her reinforces this image of a woman of loose sexual 
morals who, as such, could not have meaningfully contributed to intellectual debates.   
For example, Behn’s philosophy is reduced to tropes of licentiousness in 
Alexander Pope’s (1688-1744) collection of Literary Correspondences. In a letter from 
                                                          
2 For example, one of the few books to consider Behn’s potential Epicureanism or 
Lucretian ideologies is Laura Linkler’s book Dangerous Women: Libertines, Epicures, 
and the Rise of Sensibility (2011). With her astute and detailed examination of Behn’s 
The Luckey Chance, Linkler asserts, “Behn likely admired Lucretius for his attack on the 
hypocrisy of religion, with its superstitions, harmful practices, and teachings against free 
love” (51). However, this reading of Behn reinforces the concept of her as a sexual 
libertine rather than philosophical inquirer. In fact, there is little evidence to suggest that 
Behn’s embracement of free-love extended beyond her writings. Moreover, Lucretius 
does not praise sexuality or sexual intercourse, but rather sees it as a lowly thing that 
humans must do—like scratching an itch. Thus, if Behn is the radical sexual thinker that 
such a reading purports and a close reader of Lucretius, these would not be the elements 
of the ancient philosopher that would attract her.  
3 Wiseman and Janet Todd also make the crucial observation that Behn was at all times 
concerned with the profitability of her plays and poems. Thus, much of the sexual 
libertine elements in her plays are associated with her need to sell what was in vogue on 
the Restoration stage. Simply, sex was in high demand for a Restoration audience that 
sought to rebel against the recently overturned Puritan ban on theatre. Behn as a 
businesswoman was aware of the audience’s desire for staged scandal and that such a 
play would sell.  
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“Mrs Thomas to Mr Curll”, Thomas notes, “I own I was pleased with the Cadence of her 
Verse, tho' at the same Time I in no ways approved the Licentiousness of her Morals” 
(Thomas 20). Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749) even pokes fun at her notoriety for the 
sexual. In his description of an “Irish Gentleman” who comes to “Bath to try his Luck 
with Cards and the Women”, Fielding presents this satirical caricature by directly 
associating the reading of Behn with the man’s loose sexual morals:  “This young Fellow 
lay in Bed reading one of Mrs. Behn's Novels; for he had been instructed by a Friend, that 
he would find no more effectual Method of recommending himself to the Ladies than the 
improving his Understanding, and filling his Mind with good Literature” (Fielding 235). 
In a book that consistently satirizes, it is hard to ignore the biting humor that Fielding 
wields against Behn. Fielding’s caricature of both Behn’s writing and the Irish gentlemen 
reduce her audience to the debauched and the content of her long-form fiction to sexual, 
rather than intellectual, stimulation.  
Perhaps, however, the most graphic sexual representation of Behn in the 
eighteenth century is in George Colman’s The Connoisseur (1754). Throughout this 
book, Colman presents fictionalized visions of writers from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century. In these fantastical sketches, he presents an image of Behn on a horse: 
A BOLD masculine figure now pushed forward in a thin, airy, gay habit, which 
hung so loose about her, that she appeared to be half undrest. When she came up 
to Pegasus, she clapped her hand upon the side-saddle, and with a spring leaped 
across it, saying that she would never ride him but astride…. She shewed her legs 
at every motion of the horse, and many of the Muses turned their heads aside 
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blushing. Thalia4, indeed, was a good deal pleased with her frolicks…. Upon 
enquiring her name, I found her to be the free-spirited Mrs. BEHN. When she was 
to dismount, Lord Rochester came up, and caught her in his arms…. (Colman 
413) 
Indeed, Behn’s mounting of the horse is symbolic of the sexual licentiousness with which 
she was associated. In spite of the image Colman puts forth, Behn, in her personal life, 
was not known for lasciviousness or “loose” dress. Perhaps, her connection to Rochester 
prompted Behn’s frequent association with a sort of sexual libertinism. After all, 
Rochester’s reputation for writing pornographic satirical poetry made him a contentious 
figure in Restoration society and a problematic friendship for Behn to cultivate so 
intensely. 
Much like George Colman in The Connoisseur, eighteenth-century theatre 
historian Charles Dibdin would point to Rochester as a sign of a lack of propriety on 
Behn’s part. Her praise of Rochester’s principles would be listed as one of her many 
“animadversions” in his 1797 A Complete History of the English Stage (Dibdin 199). His 
main complaint stems from her plays, which he characterizes as so crude that “small taste 
of [her plays] will be quite strong enough for a delicate stomach”; however, it is clear that 
another source of his criticism comes from her controversial, libertine philosophical 
arguments (199).5 His disdainful reading of Behn is inspired by her friendship with 
                                                          
4 Thalia is the muse of good cheer in Greek mythology. Though Behn’s poetry, 
translations, and prose writings were often serious, she is most often considered for her 
comedic playwriting. Of all the theatrical works attributed to her, only one of which is 
considered a true tragedy, that being Abdelazer, or the Moor’s Revenge (1676).  
5 Didbin also provides some context for Behn’s reputation in the eighteenth century, 
suggesting that she was somewhat of a controversial but well-liked author among virulent 
female readers. He concedes that her “notes, animadversions, and vignettes, [are] handed 
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Rochester, her narrator’s close connection to the black protagonist in her novella 
Oroonoko, and, crucially, his own view of her as “another JUDITH in patriotism” 
(Dibdin 199). Judith is a rather controversial figure in Jewish history. Her story involves 
her assassination of Holofernes, the violent general of King Nebuchadnezzar’s army. The 
image of Holofernes’ decapitated head in Judith’s hand frequently manifests itself in 
seventeenth-century art.6 Given Dibdin’s rather spiteful take on Behn, it is hard to believe 
that he calls Behn a “Judith” as a form of praise. Dibdin views Behn’s public “amoral” 
writings, lack of British fervor (she seemed to have found the French just as compelling), 
and disregard for the Church of England as a sort of “beheading” of British nationalism. 
Regardless of Dibdin’s criticism of Behn, this image suggests that he indeed saw her as 
politically active and influential (whether positively or not) in the seventeenth-century 
intellectual network.   
In spite of these eighteenth-century discussions of Behn as sexually and 
intellectually controversial, Behn is most frequently referenced in early discussions of 
other seventeenth-century female writers. Eighteenth-century literary critics tend to 
contrast Behn with the famous female poet and playwright—Katherine Philips, who was 
frequently called by her pseudonym, Orinda. If Behn found praise, it was normally in 
subordination to the woman often referred to as the “Matchless Orinda”. More often than 
not, however, eighteenth-century critics note Behn as the amoral counterpart to Orinda’s 
                                                          
to all the young ladies in the kingdom who are subscribers to the circulating libraries” 
(Didbin 199). 
6 One of the more famous interpretations of Judith is Caravaggio’s 1602 painting “Judith 
Beheading Holofernes”. In this painting, Caravaggio captures Judith in the middle of the 
decapitation. Her face looks concerned yet confident in her action. Variants in such 
portraiture spans from Judith as fearful of her action to rather savage in her murder. 
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stateliness. John Duncombe, in his poem “The Feminead” (1751), celebrates female 
writers from the past centuries that he considers of great merit. In this poem, he  
Brings up Orinda as supreme  
The modest muse a veil with pity throws 
O'er vice's friends, and virtue's female foes; 
Abash'd she views the bold unblushing mien 
Of modern Manley, Centlivre, and Behn. (Duncombe 191-192)  
Crucially, Duncombe places Behn in conjunction with Susanna Centlivre, who was 
considered the most successful female playwright of the eighteenth century, with Behn as 
the most successful of the seventeenth. In the eyes of Duncombe, Orinda is a predecessor 
of an ethereal sort—one whom Behn and Centlivre should strive to be but are too amoral 
to achieve.  
   
 
Behn, Lucretius, and Creech—Editions and Contradictions 
Creech’s Translation of De Rerum Natura 
 By the time Thomas Creech translated De Rerum Natura into the first complete 
and published English version of Lucretius’ epic poem in 1682, the fifteenth-century 
rediscovery of Lucretius the philosopher (c. 99 BCE-c. 55 BCE) had already taken hold 
of much of the Western Renaissance. Creech was not introducing English society to 
Lucretius but, instead, providing access to the poem for members of the English 
intellectual community that did not read Latin. Notably, Aphra Behn falls into this 
category. Her poem, “To the Unknown Daphnis on His Excellent Translation of 
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Lucretius”, was a part of a collection of commendatory poems placed at the beginning of 
Creech’s published translation. 
 Many of these poems celebrate Creech’s translation as a means of increasing the 
English audience’s accessibility to Lucretius. However, Creech was not the first to 
undergo the process of translation for an English audience. He was preceded by Lucy 
Hutchinson in the 1650s. Her work with De Rerum Natura was largely unheard of by the 
time Creech published his volumes. Despite Hutchinson’s translation’s lack of publicity, 
women writers’ engagement with Lucretius was at the forefront of mid- to late-
seventeenth century British reception of Epicureanism. Women such as Cavendish and 
Behn supported Lucretian theories of atomism and religious skepticism, while 
Hutchinson sought to translate Lucretius, in part, to more accurately argue against his 
anti-providential teachings. Regardless of their position, women public intellectuals were 
compelled to enter the Lucretian conversation. Given his master Epicurus’ reported 
inclusion of women in his infamous garden, this connection is particularly fitting. 
 Women’s actual invitation to the Garden remains under speculation. For instance, 
intellectual historian Pamela Gordon argues that Epicurus’ inclusivity towards women 
and slaves was exaggerated by his contemporaries to destabilize his reputation in 
philosophical society.  Regardless of whether women and slaves were literally a part of 
the Garden or not, the recognition of the Garden as female-inclusive was prevalent. As 
Gordon writes, “To generations of Greeks and Romans, the presence of women and 
slaves in the garden was emblematic—for good or for ill—of the nature of Epicureanism” 
(Gordon 265).  
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Critics of women in the Garden were primarily critical of perceived Epicurean 
hedonism—or rather the common misconception that Epicureans were hedonistic 
pursuers of morally debased impulses. The prominent Epicurean doctrine of pleasure was 
often misconstrued to say that, for Epicureans, pleasure was rife with lust, alcohol, and 
gluttony. In reality, the Epicurean culture (which continued with Lucretius) was rather 
condemnatory towards sexual desire and excessive consumption of food or drink. 
Pleasure for the Epicurean is balance, tranquility, and conversation, and the Garden 
provides a location for this. Epicureans believe that true pleasure comes from health of 
mind and body without the fear of divine retribution in the afterlife. If death is 
nothingness and thus absent of a “great judgment”, then one lives for the present. In this 
system of thought, the Garden is a retreat from the religious and political divisions of 
non-Epicurean society. In a country reeling from the aftermath of a Civil War and 
constant religious discord, such an idea of retreat was enticing. That Lucretius writes his 
Epicurean philosophies in the face of a Roman Civil War makes De Rerum Natura all the 
more applicable and compelling for a Restoration reader.  
Many who were fascinated by Lucretius and Epicurus were indeed loyalists who 
had faced exile in the face of Civil War. Lucretius and his theory of atomism, chaos, and 
a lack of afterlife resonated deeply with a Restoration audience all too familiar with the 
perils of war. Thus, emerging translations of Lucretius were disseminated not just for his 
controversial thoughts, but for his philosophy in regards to how one maintains an interior 
serenity in the face of chaos. Lucretian and Epicurean pleasure is not based on hedonism 
then, but a search for the tranquil, the balance of a moment, the health of the body in the 
face of strife. As Lucretius writes in De Rerum Natura:  
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Yet were man to steer  
His life by sounder reasoning, he’d own  
 Abounding riches, if with mind content  
 He lived by thrift; for never, as I guess,  
 Is there a lack of little in the world. (Lucretius V. 1119-1123) 
Combined with this political and religious background, the Epicurean school’s precedent 
for including women only intensified this connection among Restoration women writers 
specifically.7  
 Despite early modern fascination with Epicurean and Lucretian ideas, this 
philosophy was not necessarily well-received. As Howard Jones details, “[D]uring the 
early years of the seventeenth century in England the atomist cause suffered not so much 
from lack of attention as from attention which for a variety of reasons had a negative 
rather than positive impact” (Jones 194). In spite of these conflicting viewpoints, during 
the 1650s, when Hutchinson began work on her own translation, Epicurean atomism 
became increasingly and seriously discussed in British intellectual circles.  This atomism 
was famously championed by Walter Charleton (1619-1707). In 1652, he published one 
of the first largely accepted books in support of Epicureanism, in which he provides 
serious consideration of atomist principles. Because of his reputation, Charleton’s 
promotion was crucial to the growing acceptance of Epicurean and Lucretian thought. 
Charleton, like Creech, specifically sought to reconcile seemingly agnostic Lucretian 
                                                          
7 Of course, unlike Behn and Cavendish, Lucy Hutchinson was a Puritan who was devout 
to her family’s anti-monarchal politics. Her husband was deeply involved in the 
Parliamentarian cause of the Civil War just prior. Though she, too, could see the wake of 
divisiveness and relate to such themes in a similar way to Cavendish and Behn.  
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ideals with Christian standards of thought in British society. To him, atomist theories of 
order and chaos suggest not the absence of an active and caring creator, but rather the 
immensity of the power and intellect in God.   
Charleton was not alone in his defense of extracting Biblically sound elements 
from controversial texts. He particularly supported of a reading of De Rerum Natura that 
allowed him to revere atomist theories while ignoring Lucretius’ larger themes of chaos, 
atheism, and the lack of an afterlife. He had as a model Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), a 
famous French libertine thinker and promoter of Epicurean thought. As Lynn Sumida Joy 
writes, Gassendi was of a dangerous strain of philosophy, as “he fully articulated an 
atomist metaphysics and physics during a period when these activities were subject to 
accusations of atheism, libertinism, and the harboring of unorthodox beliefs” (4). 
Gassendi continued to have a great impact on English apologetics for Lucretian and 
Epicurean study. Thus, the idea of selective readings of De Rerum Natura would become 
crucial to English acceptance of the poem, especially in Creech’s own annotations of his 
translation.  
Creech’s On the Nature of Things is an inherently self-conscious work. He 
prefaces the poem with his purpose for translating: “I have heard that the best Method to 
overthrow the Epicurean Hypothesis (I mean as it stands opposite to Religion) is to 
expose a full system of it to the publick view: For Atheism usually enters at the Will, and 
That debauch’t makes the Understanding as blind as it self” (Creech ix). Much as 
Hutchinson argues in her prefatory material, one reason to translate these classical poets 
is to better refute the strain of thought that stood to challenge the fabric of orthodoxy in 
the English church. Creech expresses anxiety at the growing preoccupation with and 
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celebration of Lucretius. He is especially disconcerted by “admirers of Mr. Hobbes” 
whose “Politicks are but Lucretius enlarged; his state of Nature is sung by our Poet” 
(Creech x).  
Considered by Collins an important libertine thinker of the seventeenth century, 
Hobbes dismisses trinitarian beliefs and was thought to have argued for an atomist strain 
of thought, all while promoting a conservative monarchal civilian structure. Creech’s 
denunciation of this widely read author serves as a statement against the rising tide of 
Lucretian thought in the 1650s. Throughout his text, Creech performs a rhetorical 
balancing act between the content he is translating and his own personal beliefs, largely 
through his elaborate footnotes. In the small, unassuming first edition of Book One, 
almost half of the text is not Lucretius’ poem, but poems excusing its existence and 
Creech’s interjecting statements against Lucretius’ unsavory heterodoxy in the 
marginalia. In one particular note in Book One, Creech argues against Lucretius’ label as 
an atheist:  
But since Antiquity hath but Three Atheists on record, why should we increase 
the Catalogue? He therefore asserts Divine Nature, and proves it from the 
common consent of Mankind… therefore, Lucretius makes the Case of this 
general Consent to be the constant deflux of Divine Images, which strike the 
Mind. (2) 
Indeed, charges of atheism were rampant in early modern reception of Lucretius; 
however, it is clear that Creech sought to distance his subject from such accusations to in 
turn deflect any potential charges against him as a translator. Regardless of whether 
Creech agreed with his note, he was ever cognizant of the implications of the Roman 
Lesley 17 
 
poet. For this reason, Creech edits Behn’s commendatory poem of him with a great deal 
of anxiety.  
Behn’s “To the Unknown Daphnis on His Excellent Translation of Lucretius”  
 The first version of Behn’s “To the Unknown Daphnis on His Excellent 
Translation of Lucretius” was originally published in the prefatory poems to Thomas 
Creech’s Lucretius translation, On the Nature of Things, in 1682. However, Behn 
published an alternative version of the poem in her 1684 collection, Poems Upon Several 
Occasions.8 In comparing the 1682 and 1684 editions, it becomes clear that Creech edited 
the poem that appeared in his book to appear much less controversial than Behn intended. 
Both versions of “To the Unknown Daphnis” are an outlet for Behn to issue complaints 
against societal restrictions that kept her and other women from being able to learn Latin. 
Behn celebrates Creech’s work for providing access to these women as a counteraction to 
this injustice. However, in Behn’s version of the poem, something bolder is going on than 
this self-effacement. “To the Unknown Daphnis” also provides Behn with an opportunity 
to state her own respect and appreciation of the Roman philosopher, as well as prove her 
connections to other libertine philosophers of English intellectual society. She is 
particularly interested in the intellectual discussion coming from alumnae of Wadham 
College. This collective includes Creech, Thomas Sprat, and John Wilmot Earl of 
Rochester. Though Behn suggests these men are carrying on a tradition of intellectual 
libertinism, Behn does not claim that they are of the same mind within libertine thought. 
                                                          
8 The variants described throughout this section come from the list provided in the 
anthologized edition of this poem in Janet Todd’s The Works Works of Aphra Behn, 
Volume 1: Poetry. The poem published in full is that of Creech’s poem. The variants 
provided are the changes that appeared after Behn published her intended poem in her 
book, Poems Upon Several Occassions. 
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Rather, she mentions them together to illustrate the ongoing conversations among 
freethinkers about the benefits and problems with contentious philosophies, such as 
Epicureanism.  
Given the boldness with which Behn implicates Creech in freethought, criticizes 
gender inequalities, and celebrates Lucretian philosophy, Creech, to his credit, leaves 
much of the poem intact. In fact, upon a superficial reading, Creech’s edits are relatively 
minor. Many of the lines have only a word or two replaced with another, an omitted 
phrase here or there, and some grammatical preferences. However, the cumulative effect 
of such adaptations accomplishes Creech’s two obvious objectives: a stronger reassertion 
of Behn’s status as female and an elimination of most all elements that could be viewed 
as religiously offensive or critical of religious institutions.  
 Perhaps the most covert edits that Creech makes concern Behn’s comments on 
gender inequalities. Throughout, Behn’s poem demonstrates a keen awareness of the 
complicated relationship between a female intellectual and a great Roman poet. She is 
even more cognizant about how this relationship is complicated by her lack of 
educational access. She acknowledges, from the outset, her lack of admission into the 
classical canon. She writes in her poem that “the scanted Customs of the Nation, / 
Permitt[ed] not the Female Sex to tread / The Mighty Paths of Learned Heroes Dead” 
(“Unknown Daphnis” 26-28). 
Initially, such educational limitations appear to influence her hesitant tone. In an 
uncharacteristic turn for the writer, Behn briefly appears intimidated by the content of 
which she writes. In her self-published edition, Behn states,  
 But I of feebler Seeds design’d,  
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 While the slow moveing Atoms strove  
 With Careless Heed to Form my Mind,  
 Compos’d it all of softer Love. (7-10)9 
Behn, who famously called her poetry her “masculine part”, concedes in her self-
published edition that “What in Strong Manly Verse I would express / Turns all to 
Womanish Tenderness within” (12-13). However, Behn, throughout the rest of this poem, 
readjusts the way the reader views this inferiority. Behn’s gender-based self-deprecation 
is centered not on biological traits but on the social constraints that limited her 
engagement with classical sources. She goes on later to write in her edition of the poem 
that through Creech’s translation, he “dost advance / Our Knowledge from the State of 
Ignorance; / Equals us to man!” (41-43).10 While Creech retains Behn’s critique of gender 
education gaps, his edits reinforce the prevailing image of Behn as subordinate female 
reader in ways that Behn’s does not.  
 For instance, while Behn writes “What in Strong Manly Verse I would express”, 
which suggests a natural predilection to writing at the level of her masculine counterparts, 
Creech eliminates such an assertion by changing the line to read: “What in Strong Manly 
Verse should be exprest” (“Unknown Daphnis” 13). Through this alteration, Creech 
removes her agency and capability and instead labels of the kind of poetry and reading to 
be preferred—a kind that Behn cannot produce as a woman. Creech again employs subtle 
edits to reinforce Behn’s otherness as a female writer. Behn, invoking the classical Muse 
                                                          
9 Creech’s edition leaves this section of the poem largely untouched, only substituting 
“Whilst” for “While” in line 8.  
10 Creech’s edition makes a grammatical change to this passage so that the last two lines 
cited read: “Our Knowledge from the State of Ignorance / And Equallst Us to Man!”.  
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at the beginning of her poem, calls to her “humbler Muse to bring its Tribute too”, 
whereas Creech’s version changes her genderless possessive pronoun “its” to a feminine 
“her” (3). While Behn eliminates the classical pairing of female muse and male writer, 
Creech underlines this traditional relationship and undercuts any potential commentary 
Behn could make with her pronoun choices.11 
Similarly, Behn later says that before Creech’s translation, “I curst my Birth, my 
Education” (25). Creech changes this to “I curst my Sex and Education” (25). Though 
Behn classifies her class and education as two different circumstances that limit her 
access to the classics of men, Creech does not allow education and sex to merge under 
the same umbrella as she does. In doing so, he effectively diminishes Behn’s social 
commentary and breakdown of literary gender roles.  
 Just as Creech’s subtle syntactical edits reintroduce gender normativity into 
Behn’s poem, so do his concerted changes to diction emphasize the secularity of 
Lucretian thought. Though Creech publishes Behn’s exclamation “Worthy Divine 
Lucretius and Diviner You!”, he eliminates much of the language that would make his 
scholarly enterprise have anything to do with religion (6). Behn frequently calls De 
Rerum Natura and the translational aptitude of Creech “divine” or “sacred”. In the final 
stanza, Behn deems Creech’s writing “sacred” twice. She encourages him, “Advance 
Young Daphnis then, and mayst thou prove / Still sacred in thy Poetry and Love” (126-
                                                          
11 Creech does seem particularly preoccupied with Behn and her notion of muses. Later in 
the text, Behn complains, “The Godlike Virgil and Great Homers Verse / Like Divine 
Mysteries are conceal’d from us” (29-30). Creech changes “Verse” to “Muse” in his 
version, a curious change that is difficult to decipher. Perhaps, Creech sought to dissuade 
Behn from suggesting that through his translation Behn and other female writers would 
be allowed to have a “muse” of their own. In these instances, Creech appears hesitant to 
align himself with the female liberation narrative Behn imposes on his text.  
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127). In response, Creech carefully substitutes “happy” for “sacred” (127). Moreover, at 
the conclusion of the poem Behn speaks for his readership, “We are content to know, and 
to admire thee in thy Sacred Verse”, from which Creech omits “Sacred” (142).   
Even more concerning for Creech is Behn’s rather blunt understanding of 
Lucretian ideology. Creech clearly fears that Behn’s effusive support of Lucretius 
characterizes his translation as an act in support of the ancient poet’s anti-
providentialism. This anxiety is apparent in Creech’s footnotes. Creech’s work in the 
marginalia and prefatory material is almost entirely contradicted by Behn’s original 
poem. Where Creech seeks to distance his translational work from charges of atheism, 
Behn seeks more closely to align herself with Epicurean theology. In summation, 
Creech’s edits are an attempt to de-radicalize his work without compromising Behn’s 
high praise of him. While he seems pleased that Behn’s poem draws attention to 
increased reading access for the English population, he does not wish to have his 
translation read as an act of gender reform. While he identifies himself as a man of faith, 
he does not want his book to be read as a work of faith. In many ways, Behn’s admiration 
goes too far for Creech. She examines the societal implications of increased access to 
classical texts too closely; she reads Lucretius too favorably and too well.  
 Indeed, much of the 1684 version of the poem reads as a summary of all things 
controversial in De Rerum Natura—from atomism to anti-providentialism. Behn carefully 
balances her poem’s two central aims: praising Creech and proving herself a worthy 
Lucretian. She imbues her poem with the language of Lucretius in a way that allows her 
to keep her focus on Creech while still demonstrating her inherent understanding and 
celebration of Lucretian philosophy. Her statement that “the slow moveing Atoms strove 
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/ With Careless Heed to Form my Mind” serves two functions (7-8). As stated before, 
this self-deprecation places Behn in a subordinate position in order for her to acclaim 
Creech as a follower of Epicurus, but it also serves as a palpable image of atoms (or 
thoughts of atomism) within her mind. Not only is she comfortable enough with the 
materialism of atomist philosophy to reference it in a light-hearted fashion, but she able 
to bring atomism quite literally into the female mind through this corporeal imagery.  
 Though atomism in Behn’s day was more widely acknowledged and accepted, the 
Lucretian critique of religion as fraudulent and for the feeble-minded was considered 
blasphemous—a fact that concentrated much of the footnotes of Creech’s translation. 
While Creech shies away from associating his beliefs with Lucretius, Behn seems 
ebullient in her treatment of Lucretian disdain for organized religion and theories of 
afterlife. Such enthusiasm compelled Creech to alter much of the language in his 
published draft. After commending Creech for his effortless translated prose, Behn reacts 
to the philosophy of Lucretius, presented to her through Creech’s translation:  
 It Peirces, Conquers, and Compells  
 Beyond poor Feeble Faith’s dull Oracles  
 Faith the despairing Souls content  
 Faith Last Shift of Routed Argument. (55-58)  
The language of these four lines aligns Behn with some of the most radical published 
thought of the seventeenth century. In this short space, Behn acclaims Lucretian 
philosophy as more potent than “dull” faith, while also connecting “faith” to the 
paganism of oracles. Furthermore, like Lucretius, Behn endorses the argument that faith 
is a means of intellectual comfort for the weak-minded in the face of humanity’s 
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existential questions. Behn is clear that she is not providing a synopsis of Lucretian 
philosophy but arguing for it herself. Though she must have been aware of controversy 
and radicalness of her acclamation, she does not cloak her opinions in convoluted 
language. Like Lucretius, she is unwavering in her assertion that faith is the salve for the 
“despairing Souls” and the trump card of a waning side of debate.  
While Behn’s language in this passage is straightforward, Creech alters these 
lines’ meaning without changing their structure. Creech’s edition indicates a deep fear of 
the kind of thought Behn supported. Creech’s edit of these lines reads:  
It Pierces, Conquers, and Compells 
As strong as Faith’s resistless Oracles,  
Faith the Religious Souls content,  
Faith the secure Retreat of Routed Argument. (55-58) 
Creech’s changes are obvious here, often replacing Behn’s diction with their antonyms. 
For instance, faith’s oracles in Behn’s text are “feeble” and “dull”, whereas Creech’s are 
“strong” and “resistless”. Where Behn’s view of souls searching for answers is 
“despairing”, Creech’s is “Religious”. Where, to Creech, arguments resting on 
theological principle are “secure”, to Behn, such arguments are the “Last Shift”. Creech’s 
disapproval of Behn’s radical denunciation of faith-based philosophy could not be clearer 
when comparing these variants.  
 Behn’s text does not rule out the possibility of a god but does draw a stark 
contrast between nature and religion. At the very least, Behn’s poem is a clear statement 
against religious imposition into natural epistemology. Behn denies the positive influence 
of religious dogma on poetic and intellectual development when she writes, “Poets by 
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Nature Aw, and Charm the Mind, / Are born, not made by dull Religion, or Necessity” 
(“To the Unknown” 75-76).12 However, Behn’s development as a freethinker and poet is 
starkly different from the kind of progress described here. To Behn, her lack of education 
in divinity makes her path to intellectualism and poetics much more difficult. She 
complains that women are put at a disadvantage because “Divine Mysteries are conceal’d 
from them” (30). Thus, Behn presents two distinctly different interpretations of the value 
of religion in the development of the freethinker. While she denies a divine influence 
upon male poets, she is swift to blame the lack of accessibility to studies of the divine 
when it hinders her own education and literary success.1314 
Still, Behn’s relationship to theism is complicated by her intense secularization of 
the term “sacred” and “divine”. These adjectives appear with startling frequency 
throughout the text, yet never in regards to an actual deity. Instead Behn invokes this 
religious diction to places and things. She writes of “Sacred Wadham [College]”, 
“Sacred…Friendship”, and “Courts…held as sacred Things” (59, 69, 79). In addition, 
people in “To the Unknown Daphnis” are written as religious figures. When praising 
                                                          
12 In Creech’s version of this poem, he strikes “dull” before religion.  
13 In a brief poem, Behn writes of her doubt in regards to religious affairs:  
 Doubt, ye worst Tyrant of a gen’rous Mind 
 The Coward’s ill, who dares not meet his Fate  
 And ever doubting to be fortunate  
 Falls to the Wretchedness, his Tears create. (“Doubt” 358)  
While this poem has yet to be dated by scholars, it provides an alternative perspective on 
Behn’s grappling with institutionalized truths and her own engagement with a rather free-
thinking group of intellectuals who promoted a more secular understanding of larger 
cosmic questions.  
14 Throughout this essay, the term “cosmic truths” is in reference to the broader existential 
questions of the seventeenth-century (and even today). What are we? Who/what do we 
come from? What is our order in the universe? What is our purpose? These are the 
questions that generate answers I call “cosmic truths”, which create one’s view of 
“cosmic order”.  
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“Strephon the Great” (a pseudonym for John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester), Behn says he 
“writ, and Lov’d, and Lookt like any God” (90). She writes that the students of Wadham 
College were “Fanes of Sylvain Gods / [who] Were Worshipt as Divine Abodes” (67-68). 
Her incessant employment of the words “divine” and “sacred” could suggest a taunting 
treatment of religious institutions or even a mockery of Creech’s own insistence on 
“theologizing” Lucretius in the marginalia of his text. Creech certainly seems discontent 
with the repetition. He omits the word “sacred” three times in this poem alone.  
While Behn frequently doubts religious authority in a highly Epicurean way, her 
traditionally pro-monarchal position found in her other work is challenged by Lucretius’ 
cynicism toward political authority.  Behn, who wrote frequently for and to the crown, 
appears to contradict herself when she calls into question the divine right of the throne. 
She writes, “To Gods for fear Devotion was design’d, / And safety made us bow to 
Majesty” (“Unknown Daphnis” 76).15 Just as God, in Lucretius’ worldview, is created by 
man as a fearmongering tactic to keep society in check, so too is government. The 
separation of religion, divinity, and statehood places Behn outside traditional arguments 
for monarchal rule; however, her statement does not revert Behn’s status as a devout 
Tory. In fact, Behn’s view of the state in “To the Unknown Daphnis” is reminiscent of 
the pro-monarchal writings of Machiavelli or Hobbes. In these authors’ work, monarchs 
are not given rule by a god but by their own will or birth. In spite of the absence of divine 
                                                          
15 What remains unclear is why of all the portions of this text that Creech chose not to 
edit, he chose this. These two lines, perhaps some of the most daring of the entire poem, 
remain untouched in both editions. Perhaps the convoluted wording of the text provided 
Behn with a guise for what lies in the subtext; however, for such a thoughtful edit on 
Creech’s part, why this remains is hard to reconcile given the almost paranoid changes 
that appear throughout the rest of the poem.  
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right, Machiavelli and Hobbes both suggest that respected governmental structures are 
essential in maintaining societal homeostasis. This Behn’s poem seems to argue for the 
same understanding of governmental authority. Though this passage places Behn in a 
minority of royalists, it actually reflects the complex conservative-progressive tension 
within Behn’s political and religious freethought. As such, “To the Unknown Daphnis” 
also provides Behn an opportunity to reconcile her pro-institutional political beliefs with 
her anti-institutional religious tendencies.  
This dichotomy reemerges when Behn campaigns for the “Learned Thirsis”—her 
pseudonym for Thomas Sprat (1635-1713). Sprat was a colleague of Thomas Creech’s at 
Wadham College and the writer of several poems and books, most notably his poem on 
“The Plague of Athens” (1667). Behn commends Sprat for standing up to the “mad 
Senate-House”—her term for the Rump Parliament, which existed as the rather shaky 
governing body during the Interregnum. She equates his offensive against this political 
body to a dynamic support of Christian orthodoxy (88). In effusive verse, she envisions 
Sprat’s activism:  
 That [which] Threatned to ruine to the Church and State,  
Unmoved He stood and fear’d no Threats of Fate,  
That Loyal Champion for the Church and Crown 
That Noble Ornament of the Sacred Gown16 
Still did his Sovereigns Cause espouse,  
And was above the Thanks of the mad Senate-House. (84-88) 
                                                          
16 The line “That Noble Ornament of the Sacred Gown” is omitted in Creech’s version—
one of the many instances in the variants in which it is suggestive that Creech grew 
tiresome of Behn’s imposition of divine rhetoric upon the secular.  
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Though Behn appears to deny divine monarchal right, she calls Sprat’s work against the 
Rump Parliament “Soveriegn” and proves him a defendant of the “Sacred Gown” (86-
87). Her praise of Sprat’s defense of religious control contradicts her earlier denunciation 
of religious impositions on freethought, but it also supports Hobbesian ideals of the 
relationship between church and state.  
Indeed, Behn’s “To the Unknown Daphnis” reads as a rather Hobbesian text. 
While Behn bemoans institutional religious control over intellectual production, she also 
frequently celebrates a monarchy that exerts its control, in part, through the Church of 
England. Thus, Behn grapples directly with the contradiction inherent between her 
political conservativism and religious libertinism within this poem. These contradictions 
are similar to those found in Hobbes’ work. Hobbes supports the Church as a tool of 
monarchal control over larger society, but one gets the sense that Hobbes sees himself as 
outside or even above the larger populace. Perhaps, Behn is arguing the same 
exceptionalism for herself in the “To the Unknown Daphnis”. Monarchal and religious 
control is needed for non-intellectuals, but intellectuals such as Behn, Hobbes, Creech, 
etc. should be excluded from such academic governance. 
 
Behn’s Praise of Wadham College 
 Wadham College was an Oxford University institution with a growing reputation 
for generating communities of freethought. The three alumnae to which Behn refers from 
Wadham College studied there over the course of several decades and also a embraced 
multiplicity of philosophical positions. Thomas Sprat arrived in 1657 and remained with 
a fellowship there until 1670; the Earl of Rochester arrived in 1660 at the age of 12; and 
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Thomas Creech, lastly, came to Wadham in 1670 (Wells 77, 83, 97). Not only is Behn’s 
construction of a “Wadham collective” complicated by the time frames in which they 
studied at the university but is further problematized by the divergence of their opinions 
within freethought. In an effort to construct an idealized pastoral community, Behn refers 
to Sprat and Rochester as educational forbearers to Creech. By doing this, Behn places 
Creech in a larger freethinking community, particularly that which came out of Wadham 
college in the 1660s-1670s.  
 In addition to Sprat, Creech, and Rochester, Wadham College was also notably 
the educational center for John Wilkins. In his treatises The Discovery of a World in the 
Moone and A Discourse Concerning a New Planet, Wilkins argues the moon may be 
inhabitable and that people would one day reach the moon. He also promoted a sort of 
natural theology that was prominent at the time, particularly at Wadham College. In his 
proposition that “The Moon may be a World”, Wilkins writes, “That a plurality of worlds 
doth not contradict any principle of reason or faith” (Wilkins 28). His defense is 
supported by the lack of scientific authority of famous theologians like Saint John, 
Moses, and Thomas Aquinas who oppose this many-worlds proposition. For Wilkins and 
other Restoration freethinkers, natural theology attempts to reconcile religious principles 
with the emergent scientific discoveries of the past centuries. This trend was especially 
inspired by Sir Frances Bacon’s book Novum Organum (1620) in which Bacon views the 
natural world as a book of God. As Wadham College historian, J. Wells, denotes, “So 
Bacon and his ‘Novum Organon’ were looked upon (even in his own day) as the starting-
point of the new movement” (Wells 71). Both Wilkins and Bacon spoke for the existence 
of a divine whilst separating the study of nature from the study of Scripture.  
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This division of religious doctrine from empirical study would have certainly 
appealed to Behn. She interjects in “To the Unknown Daphnis”, “Hail Sacred Wadham!” 
and writes of Wadham as a sort of cradle for the great upcoming poets and thinkers:  
They blest thy Fabrick, and said—do Thou 
Our Darling Sons contain;  
We Thee our Sacred Nursery ordain,  
They said, and Blest, and it was so…. 
What Veneration should be paid  
To Thee that hast such wondrous Poets made? (“Unknown Daphnis” 63-66, 71-
72) 
Though Wilkins is not mentioned in this praise, Behn’s earlier comments arguing for the 
separation of the religious and the scientific would have appealed to the doctrine of 
Wilkins who sought to reconcile Scriptural theology with natural philosophy. However, 
her references to Sprat and Rochester serve a perhaps more complex relationship than a 
nod to Wilkins would have.  
Indeed, Behn does not only comment on Sprat’s political activism. She primarily 
regards him in connection to his poem “The Plague of Athens”. This plague is the same 
that Lucretius describes at the conclusion of De Rerum Natura. Both scholars wrote 
within the context of a civil war, and because of this, Lucretius and Sprat wrote of the 
plague as a parallel to the chaos of a state divided. Behn elucidates this theme in both 
works by calling the English Civil War “a greater Plague [that] reign[ed] / Than that 
which Athens did depopulate” (81-82). Behn is pointing to Sprat’s epic poem which 
vividly imagines the personalized horror of the Athenians in the face of the ravaging 
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plague. He, like Lucretius, views the plague as a sign of the absence of divine 
intervention. Sprat concludes his poem:  
Vertue was now esteem'd an empty name, 
And honesty the foolish voice of fame; 
For having pass'd those tort'ring flames before, 
They thought the punishment already o're, 
Thought Heaven no worse torments had in store; 
Here having felt one Hell, they thought there was no more. (Sprat XXI)  
Behn certainly would have been cognizant of the similarities in approach to the 
plague, and it is clear that Sprat’s impression of the Greek real-life tragedy was 
influenced by the Roman poet. Lucretius also writes of a collective atheism that arises 
from the devastation of a plague and the breakdown of human dignity in the face of 
horror:  
For now no longer men 
Did mightily esteem the old Divine, 
The worship of the gods: the woe at hand 
Did over-master. (Lucretius, Book VI, 1279-1282) 
For Lucretius, the plague serves as a perfect example of the absence of a caring or an 
involved deity. Placed at the end of De Rerum Natura, the plague is the embodiment of 
the chaos and futility of man’s religious devotion. For Sprat, this plague is perceived in a 
much more distressing way. Sprat seems to languish over the theological uncertainty that 
such an event elicits. Thus, Sprat’s reimagining of the plague is not a contemporizing of 
Lucretius, but rather an alternative response to Athenian events, religious skepticism, and 
his own context within the English Civil War.  
Lesley 31 
 
 Unlike Sprat, there is much textual evidence and publication history that points to 
a close relationship between Rochester and Behn. He and Behn worked on many projects 
together. He edited her work frequently, and they often collaborated on projects together 
and commented poetically on each other’s work. For instance, Behn’s famous poem 
based on Ovidian impotence jokes, “The Disappointment”, shares many similar themes 
with Rochester’s “The Imperfect Enjoyment”. Moreover, she would very publicly mourn 
his early death (he was only 33 at his passing) in her elegy “On the Death of the Late Earl 
of Rochester” (1680). In this poem, she laments his loss for the literary and intellectual 
community, mourning that “Satyr has lost its Art, its Sting is gone” and that the cupids of 
the world have now have darts that “Have lost their wonted power of piercing hearts” 
(“On the Death” 27, 53). Both of these lines are in reference to Rochester’s penchant for 
writing vividly and often violently of the sexual, yet the visceral nature of his poetry 
served a larger purpose. Rochester exposed “Fop and Cully” in society through the 
poetically pornographic (28).  A woman’s praise of another man’s infamous gallantry and 
overt sexuality was a dangerous undertaking, but one with which Behn would have been 
familiar in critiques of her own writings.  
Behn also draws from Rochester’s seemingly agnostic writings, particularly those 
that she sees as an extension of Epicureanism: “Large was his Fame, but short his 
Glorious Race, / Like a young Lucretius and dy’d apace” (“On the Death” 68-69). 
Interestingly, this comment directly contradicts her statement in “To the Unknown 
Daphnis” that Creech’s translation allowed her to read and understand Lucretius for the 
first time.  “On the Death of the Late Earl of Rochester” was published nearly two years 
before Creech’s version of De Rerum Natura. These inconsistent accounts of readership 
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prove that, at the very least, Behn was comfortable with the general principles of 
Lucretian ideology long before Creech’s translation was in the marketplace.  
Indeed, it seems that Behn has a rather strong Epicurean-Lucretian background by 
the time she penned her friend’s elegy. Rochester did promote the same sort of antipathy 
for religion as his Roman predecessor. He translated (without apologetic footnotes) a 
nihilistic passage from a play of Seneca’s:  
After Death nothing is, and nothing Death,  
The utmost limit of a Gasp of Breath.  
Let the ambitious Zealot lay aside 
His hopes of Heaven; whose Faith is but his Pride.  
Let slavish Souls lay by their Fear,  
Nor be concern’d which way, nor where,  
After this Life they shall be hurl’d;  
Dead, we become the Lumber of the World. (Rochester 1-8)  
What Rochester chooses to translate is more telling than how he translates it. While 
Creech translates the entirety of De Rerum Natura thus making the more controversial 
parts unavoidable, Rochester extracts from Seneca this passage which highlights Roman 
religious doubt. Though Seneca’s stoic philosophy was rather more providential than his 
character’s, this text echoes much of what Lucretius says—that there is no after life and 
thus one must not be anxious about whether they end up in a good or bad place.17 What 
                                                          
17 It is paramount to note that Behn would become closely connected to the thinking of 
Seneca in her translational work. In 1675, Behn ventured to one of her earliest forays into 
philosophical French texts when she translated La Rochefoucauld’s edition of Reflexions 
ou Sentences et Maximes morales. Seneca’s Moral Epistles (in which he praises 
Epicurus) are La Rochefoucauld’s subject. In the case of Behn, her translation of La 
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matters is the present health and happiness of the body (which, again, excludes hedonistic 
behavior).  
Moreover, in the same passage, Seneca’s character states a similar belief that 
Behn and Lucretius extend—that fear-inducing deities are man-made and exercise 
societal control. Rochester translates:  
God’s everlasting fiery Jayls,  
(Devis’d by Rogues, dreaded by Fools)  
With his grim grisly Dog that keeps the Door,  
Are senseless Stories, idle Tales,  
Dreams, Whimsies, and no more. (14-18) 
Thus, Behn’s inclusion of Lucretius in her praise of Rochester reveals an interest in and 
certainly a respect for Lucretian and anti-religious18 strains of freethought even before 
Creech’s publication.  
Her close relationship with Rochester and her poem celebrating nearly all that was 
disdained by Rochester’s critics were the sources of some tension in Behn’s friendship 
with his cousin and fellow writer, Anne Wharton. In her praise of Behn’s elegy to 
Rochester, Wharton still provides some critique for her friend and colleague: she advises 
that Behn avoid the libertine writings that her cousin enjoyed. She urges Behn to “Scorn 
                                                          
Rochefoucauld’s work was entitled Seneca Unmasqued—a title sure to attract a curious 
reader familiar with the controversial nature of the Roman philosopher.  
18 As the term “anti-religious” will be used frequently throughout this essay, it is 
important to distinguish that, in this paper, it is not to be conflated with “atheism”. Anti-
religion, for the purposes of this essay, is the questioning and challenging of 
institutionalized doctrine propagated by religious organizations—organizations that 
scholars like Behn would see as be roadblocks to natural philosophy. “Anti-religion” 
should be read to be shorthand for “anti-religious establishment and anti-religiously 
enforced thought”.  
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meaner themes, declining low desire, / And bid [her] Muse maintain a Vestal fire” 
(Wharton 22-23). This “Vestal fire” refers to the Roman pagan tradition of Vestal 
Virgins—high class priestesses who maintained a religious fire in the middle of the city.  
Wharton’s plea that Behn maintain such a fire could just as well be translated to read “put 
on a more virginal façade in your writings”.  
Ignoring her friend’s advice, Behn maintains her relationship with Rochester 
posthumously even after her elegiac poem. In “To the Unknown Daphnis”, she spends 
nearly as much time praising Rochester as she does praising Creech. She concludes her 
commendations by exclaiming, “No sooner was fam’d Strephons Glory set, / Strephons 
the soft, the Lovely, Gay and Great; / But Daphnis rises like the Morning Star” (“To the 
Unknown Daphnis” 107-109). In Behn’s construction of the intellectual community that 
is Wadham Colledge, Lucretian ideals are passed on to Wadham, and Wadham passes a 
tradition of freethought onto its students such as Sprat, Creech, and Rochester. Likewise, 
throughout Creech’s translation as she sees it, Creech passes on the torch of libertine 
thought to Behn because of his translation. Behn, through her creation of this rhetorically 
constructed chain of free thought, details multiple strains of linearity. She establishes a 
connection from Lucretius to Wadham College, specifically through the connection of 
Sprat and Creech, both of whom recognize parallels between Lucretian context and 
doctrine and Restoration context and doctrine. She also creates a legacy of intellectual 
critique from Sprat to Rochester to Creech which stems from shared interest—Lucretius. 
As Behn praises the work of these men, she also creates a sense of lineage between 
herself, Wadham students, and Lucretius. She establishes her own pseudo-college of 
sorts, one which she can enter.  
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Perhaps, Behn views this collective or, more broadly, the Oxford University 
system as resembling the pastoral Golden Age. Behn’s poetic preoccupation with the 
fictionalized ideal of the “Golden Age” celebrates an absence of physical needs and an 
abundance of free and equitable discourse.19 Just as the Epicurean garden allows women 
to enter the conversation, so too does Behn’s fictional pastoral ideal of the Golden Age. 
By invoking the motifs of the pastoral with the philosophy of a gender-inclusive 
Epicureanism as she sees it, Behn draws from two classically idyllic “gardens” in order to 
defend her entry into this freethinking circle.  
Behn thus weaves together many strains of thought throughout “To the Unknown 
Daphnis’: the pastoral with the Epicurean, the politically conservative with the religiously 
rebellious, an assertion of gender norms within a celebration of gender liberation. In “To 
the Unknown Daphnis”, these ideas coexist and interact with one another in complex and 
dynamic conversation. Though many times Behn’s views appear to contradict within her 
body of work, Behn as a freethinker seems to avoid such absolutes of knowledge and 
instead celebrates a fluctuating process of questioning and debate. As such, Behn’s praise 
of Creech’s translation provides Behn not only a means to prove herself adept in different 
libertine intellectual discussions of the later seventeenth century, but also a vehicle for 
her to present rather radical ideals that exist far beyond the rhetoric of women’s sexuality 
and rights. Instead, Behn participates in the theological and philosophical discussions that 
perplexed the greatest thinkers of the Restoration and asserts her place among them. Yet 
                                                          
19 Behn’s most frequent poetic mode is in fact pastoral. Just as she does in “To the 
Unknown Daphnis”, Behn refers to people (usually fellow writers) in her life by 
pseudonyms that are consistent across different poems. She even pens a poem entitled, 
“The Golden Age”, which celebrates gender equality, a desire for simplicity, and 
equitable conversation.  
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her radical interpretation of the Wadham collective and her connection to Rochester 
makes her a misfit within this idealized community.  
 
Oroonoko: Traces of Lucretius and Anti-Religion  
Oroonoko20 as Religious Commentator 
 Behn’s controversial streak continues with her discussion of colonial and race 
relations in her novella Oroonoko (1688), yet few scholars have drawn parallels between 
the philosophy of “To the Unknown Daphnis” and the religious commentary found in the 
oft-studied novella. While eighteenth-century critics such as Dibdin criticize “her 
[narrator’s] platonic intimacy with Oroonoko”, such a critique overlooks the anti-
religious and freethinking themes that dominate the text in favor of a racially centered 
reading (Dibdin 199). An exception is Laura Rosenthal, who notes the agnostic trends 
within Oroonoko. She notes that the conversion of Oroonoko to white Christianity 
“seems a more and more distant possibility as 'Christian' comes to mean the same thing as 
'liar'” (Rosenthal 152). Rosenthal, later in her essay, muses in passing, “Perhaps it was in 
Surinam too that the author began to lose her faith”, but the question remains unanswered 
and underexplored in regards to how Oroonoko’s position on faith reflects Behn’s (154). 
Indeed, throughout the text, Oroonoko defames Christianity as a whole, particularly in 
regards to his own betrayal and brutalization at the hands of Christian colonizers. Behn, 
in Oroonoko, carefully positions such defamation after her protagonist has been 
instructed in and exposed to Christianity in both theory and practice. Thus, Oroonoko 
                                                          
20 Oroonoko is also called “Caesar” when he reaches Surinam, because of his Roman 
features. The two names will be used interchangeably, as they are in the novella.  
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provides a useful and educated “outsider” conduit through which Behn can project her 
own religious critique.  
Oroonoko makes overtly negative statements against Christianity, calling 
Christian gods “the vilest of all creeping things” with no “power to make them just, brave 
or honest”, while declaring “there was no faith in the white men or the gods they adored 
who instructed them in principles so false that honest men could not live amongst them” 
(Oroonoko 66). These proclamations come at the end of the narrative, in which Oroonoko 
has been betrayed by the white men who have been his companions. Behn places her hero 
in close connection with white Christians in order to make him an expert foreign observer 
of Christian hypocrisy.  
Behn does not shy from corroborating the very hypocrisy Oroonoko unveils. The 
narrator often points to hypocritical practices among the white people that run counter to 
Christian doctrine. She writes that for the white people, “Sunday was their day of 
debauch” where “all the whites were overtaken in drink” (Oroonoko 61). However, it is 
not just the dubious nature of Christian morality in the midst of a slave trade to which 
Oroonoko draws attention. The narrator, who claims Oroonoko as her friend, is called 
“his Great Mistress” (49). She claims that she can speak to him comfortably about “the 
lives of the Romans” and of Christian thought (49). She writes, “But of all the discourses 
Caesar liked the worst, and would never be reconciled to our notions of the Trinity, of 
which he ever made a jest; it was a riddle, he said, would turn his brain to conceive, and 
one could not make him understand what faith was” (49).  
To posit anti-trinitarian thought through this text suggests that Behn was aware of 
the rising doubt surrounding trinitarian theology among heterodox thinkers. A denial of 
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the Trinity was an especially dangerous stance in this period, and Behn seems aware. She 
is able to disassociate herself from such doubt through the racial other. As she does with 
her portrayal black, anti-religious monarchal power in her play Abdelazer, Behn projects 
her own hostility towards institutional religion via an unlikely mouthpiece—her black 
protagonist.  
It is what Behn excludes from Oroonoko that makes the author’s antagonism 
towards orthodox thinking especially clear. For instance, Oroonoko contrasts his captors’ 
Christian faith with their cruel actions towards him. He cites that in his “suffering [he] 
gain[s] so true a knowledge both of [the captain] and of [Christian] gods” (Oroonoko 41). 
Where Behn could contest this statement by including exonerative actions from the white 
characters in Surinam, she refuses, even when it comes to herself. By her own avatar’s 
inability to show true benevolence to Oroonoko through her absence during his rebellion 
and death, Behn defends her protagonists’ argument so far that it the hypocrisy even 
extends to the narrator as a member of the white Christian society.  
Through this close connection between betrayal and Christian faith, Behn 
constructs Oroonoko as a careful reader of Western white and colonial civilization.  To 
establish this identity of her protagonist, Behn makes Oroonoko a translator of sorts to 
the natives for his group of cohorts in Surinam. The narrator explains, “Caesar begot so 
good an understanding between the Indians and the English that there were no more fears 
or heartburnings during our stay, but we had perfect, open and free trade with them” (60). 
Oroonoko is thus an amiable bridge for both the English to speak to the natives, just as he 
is a bridge between Behn the freethinker and her audience.  
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Though Oroonoko is her most famous black protagonist, Behn draws upon the 
racial but politically astute other in an earlier play—her only tragedy, Abdelazer or the 
Moor’s Revenge. The play, written in 1676, shares some of the same sympathetic 
treatment of black people, yet varies in its approach—Abdelazer is not memorialized 
honorably like Oroonoko. However, both the play and the novella serve to critique the 
blind faith in church and state that are representative of white-centric Christianized 
society. Like Oroonoko, Abdelazer is African royalty but has been conquered by a white 
power—Oroonoko at the hands of a duplicitous slave trader and Abdelazer at his father’s 
fall to Spanish colonial powers. While Oroonoko works for his freedom, Abdelazer 
works to conquer—a feat which he achieves briefly by seducing the Spanish queen. He 
fleetingly reigns as king before he is usurped by Prince Phillip. As Abdelazer fights the 
racist and patrilineal forces that work against him, he criticizes the Spanish supporters of 
Prince Phillip and the Catholic Cardinal. He calls them “[t]housands of Bigots who think 
to cheat the World / Into an Opinion, that fighting for the Cardinal is a pious work” 
(Abdelazer 4.3.434). He goes on to say, “Thy giddy Rout are guided by Religion / More 
than by Justice, Reason, or Allegiance” (4.7.444).  
Thus, the themes present in Abdelazer and Oroonoko reflect those that Behn 
would place 
in her own words when she celebrates the Creech translation of De Rerum Natura. While 
her black protagonists are assumed pagan because of their ethnicity and low status in 
white society, Behn reveals a particular strain of radical libertine thought in these 
characters that is only available to those who truly understand the principles of 
Christianity. She presents these same thematic elements in her own discussion of the 
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Lucretius translation. Her disdain for those that blindly support a religion at the expense 
of rational philosophy reflects her characters’ disdain for a Christian society that rarely 
acts on Christian principles. She, like her protagonists, questions the authority of a faith 
that seems to be the “Secure Retreat” of arguments that are thwarted. Her connection to 
Oroonoko and Abdelazer does not necessarily suggest a proto-abolitionist approach 
towards the racial other, but indeed, she appears to have recognized a sort of shared status 
between her and her protagonists. Like Behn in relations to scholars from Wadham 
College, Oroonoko and Abdelazer are allowed to speak in philosophical discourses but 
not to truly converse. They, like she, see themselves as outside observers due to their 
educational and discursive opportunities.   
 Because of this shared status, it is not surprising then that Behn creates a 
“Epicurean Garden” in Oroonoko in which the narrator, Caesar, and the other women in 
Surinam can talk of philosophy. She establishes a sense of ease in discussion that is quite 
the respite from the duplicitous actions of the white men. She writes that Oroonoko 
“liked the company of us women much above the men…. So that obliging to him to love 
us very well, we had all the liberty of speech with him, especially myself, whom he 
called his Great Mistress; and indeed my word would go a great way with him” 
(Oroonoko 49).  
As described before, the Epicurean Garden was notorious for its inclusivity of 
different genders and class backgrounds. What is unique about the garden in Oroonoko is 
that Behn’s fictionalized avatar (the narrator) serves as the leader and educator of the 
group. It is she who describes theological principles and she who educates Oroonoko on 
the history of Western civilization. The narrator boasts, “I entertained [Oroonoko] with 
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the lives of the Romans, and great men, which charmed him to my company” (49). 
Indeed, the narrator even compares her garden to the Italian landscape. When detailing 
the natural elements of her new home, the narrator praises, “Not all the gardens of 
boasted Italy can produce a shade to out-vie this which Nature had joined with Art to 
render so exceeding fine” (Oroonoko 52). By placing Epicurean-style conversation in her 
own garden, Behn emulates and controls the dialogue of freethought in Surinam.  
However, in an oft overlooked element of this portion of the novella, the narrator 
includes not only Oroonoko in the garden, but Imoinda, his lover and wife. When 
speaking to Imoinda, the narrator stylizes her content according to her gender. She 
teaches Imoinda “all the pretty works that [she] was mistress of, …telling her stories of 
nuns, and endeavouring to bring her to the knowledge of the true God” (49). Though 
Caesar is offered the opportunity to dispute the validity of trinitarian doctrine, Behn 
oddly limits Imoinda’s involvement in these philosophical conversations. She educates 
her about those who serve God chastely and women who believe wholeheartedly the 
teachings of Christian doctrine. Thus, she excludes Imoinda from discussion and debate 
but not from learning on the whole.21  
 Behn’s narrator takes on a highly masculinized role as both teacher and censor. 
She withholds difficult philosophical ideas from Imoinda yet challenges Caesar. Behn 
constructs a mock educational system in her Surinam garden—one in which she dictates 
                                                          
21 Behn’s exclusion of Imoinda from the controversial discussion is perhaps further aligns 
Behn’s avatar with Oroonoko. Oroonoko argues for an exceptionalism to his blackness 
that should prevent him from being captive to white slaveholders—he does not argue for 
abolition in totality. Perhaps, Behn is suggesting the same as Oroonoko in regards to her 
inclusion of women in the context of philosophical discourse. In excluding Imoinda, 
Behn makes herself the exceptional woman, not a pan-female liberator.  
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who learns what based on gender. Perhaps the narrator’s discernment reconstructs the 
educational system in which women are excluded from the rhetoric of doubt. Indeed, 
Behn’s avatar, though open about her gender, rarely draws attention to it until it is most 
convenient for her. The narrator—who is able to watch Oroonoko conquer beasts with his 
bare hands, capture electric eels, and question the epistemological authority of 
Christianity without a sense of concern—suddenly turns “but sickly, and very apt to fall 
into fits of dangerous illness upon any extraordinary melancholy” (Oroonoko 75). She 
does this so as to distance herself from the brutalization and murder of Oroonoko at the 
end—a plot device that reinstates Behn’s character into the decidedly white and feminine 
realm that she is supposed to operate within all along. Though they offer each other a 
glimpse into thought from separate spheres of the world, by the end, Behn’s narrator is of 
the white Christian class yet again, while Oroonoko is made the outside other.  
That Oroonoko was written nearly six years after the first publication of Creech’s 
translation of De Rerum Natura would suggest that she had Lucretian and Epicurean 
ideals in the back of her mind as she drew the decidedly anti-religious figure of 
Oroonoko. The same libertine thought that is expressed in her praise of both Rochester’s 
work and Creech’s translation exists in the rhetoric of Oroonoko and Abdelazer. 
Oroonoko distrusts the establishment of Christianity and those that work to enforce it. To 
him, Christianity does not align with rational thinking. Instead, he argues that Christians 
“wanted only but to be whipped into the knowledge of the Christian gods” (Oroonoko 
66). Oroonoko stresses that Christians are not to be trusted, stating that “with them a man 
out be eternally on his guard and never to eat and drink with Christians without his 
weapon of defence in his hand, and, for his own security, never to credit one word they 
Lesley 43 
 
spoke” (66). As noted before, Behn only reiterates Oroonoko’s condemnation by the 
duplicitous actions of the white people in the novella.  
Oroonoko’s status as the other in Surinam allows Behn to discredit her anti-
religious mouthpiece insofar as it aids her own perception as the author. In spite of the 
benefits Behn reaps from the audiences’ stereotypes of Caesar as a raving pagan 
foreigner, she attempts throughout the novella to reverse his social status in the mind of 
the reader.22 In the same language with which she memorializes Creech and Rochester, 
she honors Oroonoko after his gruesome death at the stake in the wake of his failed 
rebellion. She mourns:  
Thus died this great man, worthy of a better fate and more sublime wit than mine 
to write his praise. Yet, I hope the reputation of my pen is considerable enough to 
make his glorious name to survive to all ages, with that of the brave, the beautiful 
and the constant Imoinda. (Oroonoko 76-77) 
Behn draws a rhetorical parallel between her praise of Oroonoko the Philosopher and the 
men that she praises in English intellectual circles. Behn often belittles herself in her 
commendation of freethinkers. In “To the Unknown Daphnis”, she writes “But I 
unlearn’d in Schools disdain that Mine / Should treated at any feast but Thine” (23-24). 
She performs a similar diminishment of her power as a writer in her poem “On the Death 
of E. Waller, Esq.”, a poem she penned upon the death of Restoration poet Edmund 
                                                          
22 This is not to suggest that his social reversal in Behn’s prose is for abolitionist 
purposes. Oroonoko himself will go on in the novella to argue for a certain brand of 
slavery (i.e. when a people have been conquered, when people prove to be “brutish” by 
Oroonoko’s standards, etc.). Oroonoko argues for a sort of principle of exceptionalism 
that does not include him in the ranks of slaves but does not argue that every person 
should be necessarily free from slavery.  
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Waller (1606-1687).23 In this text, her self-deprecation extends to both her health and her 
gender: “The Wit Sublime, the Judgment Find, and Strong; / Whilst mine, like Transitory 
Flowers, decay, / That come back to deck thy Tomb a short-liv’d Day” (21-23). Behn 
thus imitates the language and power structure of her panegyric poetry to English 
thinkers in discussing her African philosopher.  
Yet, Behn does not limit her praise to that of Oroonoko. She still concludes the 
text with a reference to Imoinda. As with the scene of the Epicurean/Surinam garden, 
Imoinda is brought in subtly but intentionally. Just as she enters in the debates of the day 
(albeit in a censored fashion), Imoinda is included in the celebration of her partner as a 
crucial factor in his impression upon the Surinam community. Though Oroonoko is the 
one who advertises Epicurean theological doubts, Imoinda is included in the discussion 
as a moral reminder of his goodness in spite of his anti-religious thought. Imoinda is a 
chaste and loyal wife to a controversial man. Perhaps Behn, through the education and 
posthumous praise of Imoinda, sought to show that morality is not contingent upon 
Christian-institutionalized thought. For instance, though Imoinda is taught about the 
Catholic Church, she is never said to believe in or convert to any of the Christian 
doctrines she is taught. Though the men of the camp say that Imoinda (who is referred to 
as Clemene in Surinam) has been “christened”, there is little indication that this was in 
concurrence with her will (45). In fact, it is suggested that they perform the religious rite 
simply so they feel better about sexually pursuing her—an act proved yet again futile as 
                                                          
23 Edmund Waller was a well-respected poet by the Restoration, but during the Civil War 
had floundered many times between pro-parliamentary and pro-monarchal positions. By 
the time Behn wrote his elegy, Waller had the respect of men such as John Dryden. 
Celebrating his clout may have advanced her own poetry as a litmus test for seventeenth-
century literary taste.  
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she “denies [them] all with noble disdain” (45). This disdain is characterized as so noble 
that they even refuse to rape her.  
Furthermore, the way Imoinda dies suggests that she did not believe in Christian 
doctrines against suicide. Indeed, in her death she does not reference a god at all. Still, 
her suicide is celebrated by the narrator as a stoic action. After Oroonoko and Imoinda 
decide that killing her would be the best option, Behn writes:  
 While tears trickled down his cheeks, hers were smiling with joy she should die 
by so  
noble a hand and be sent in her own country (for that is their notion of the next 
world) by  
him she so tenderly loved and so truly adored in this; for wives have a respect for 
their husbands equal to what other people pay a deity…. It being thus, you may 
believe the deed was soon resolved on, and it is not to be doubted but the parting, 
the eternal leave-taking of two such lovers… must be very moving. (Oroonoko 
71-72)  
 This passage is extraordinary in the narrator’s praise of the sacrificial and suicidal 
choice Imoinda makes, as it runs counter traditional Christian doctrine that suicide, at all 
costs, is a sin.24 Imoinda’s understanding of an afterlife is acknowledged, and yet, Behn 
casts doubt that her notion of eternity is necessarily true. Instead Behn calls the lovers’ 
parting “eternal”, insinuating that there would be no afterlife in which Oroonoko and 
Imoinda could reunite.  
                                                          
24 Possibly, Behn makes a nod to scholars such as Donne, who in Biathanatos argues that 
there are noble reasons to choose suicide. Escaping slavery and honoring one’s husband 
could have certainly been considered in his argument.  
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Moreover, just as Behn compares religious devotion to blind monarchal loyalty in 
“To the Unknown Daphnis”, she does the same here with Imoinda’s loyalty to and trust 
in her husband. In this passage however, Behn calls those who are fervent in their belief 
of a higher power “other people”. In distancing her narrator from those that are devout 
deists, she places her in much more common conversation with the two atheistic 
protagonists who are committing what many Restoration Christians would call a mortal 
sin. Regardless of her suicide, Imoinda is still “brave” and “constant” in the eyes of the 
narrator. Behn echoes her praise of Lucretius in her praise of Oroonoko’s wife. To Behn, 
Oroonoko and Imoinda’s act of murder-suicide and rebellion against the white order is 
just further proof that “whoever had heard [Oroonoko] speak would have been convinced 
of their errors that all fine wit is confined to the white men, especially to those of 
Christendom” (15). With this consideration of uprising and religious skepticism, Behn 
seems to argue at the very least that Christianity is not the only lens through which to 
answer philosophical and cosmic questions.  
 This scene puts Imoinda through the “Romanization” that Oroonoko undergoes 
within the text.25 Suicide was often celebrated in Roman culture to save one’s honor in 
the face of military or political defeat. While disassociated from the realm of combat or 
government, Lucretius himself was said to have committed suicide having been driven to 
madness by his philosophical doctrines. Imoinda’s suicide is then in the tradition of not 
                                                          
25 Behn calls the reader’s attention to his Roman qualities from the start, famously 
referring to him as Caesar upon his arrival and noting that his “nose was rising and 
Roman instead of African and flat” (Oroonoko 15). From the introduction of Oroonoko, 
the narrator establishes the protagonists’ uncanny knowledge of Western civilization and 
history. Even while in Africa, Oroonoko is said to have “heard of and admired the 
Romans” (14). He astutely references famous Roman enemies and wars later in the text. 
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only Roman stoics but also Lucretius. Thus, Imoinda is, like Oroonoko, developed into a 
model of the stoicized Epicurean.  
Behn’s development of Oroonoko as “Roman” has been well-documented and 
commented upon in critical treatments. David E. Hoegberg argues that Behn’s portrayal 
of Oroonoko’s story is one that closely aligns with Achilles or Julius Caesar. He contends 
that these close classical connections “tell a story of Oroonoko’s struggle against less 
tangible forces of ideology and belief” (Hoegberg 240). He goes on to suggest that 
Oroonoko’s death parallels that of Julius Caesar’s own murder at the hand of his political 
and ideological enemies: “By condemning Oroonoko to the fate of Caesar, the whites 
also condemn themselves to the fate of Caesar's enemies, unconsciously admitting their 
guilt” (240).  
 However, such criticism leaves open the place of Behn’s narrator as both 
Oroonoko’s friend and a member of the white community. Her blame in Oroonoko’s 
downfall is one of absence and passivity. Where she is his active observer and 
philosophical sparring partner, her concern for Oroonoko only extends as far as it benefits 
her intellectual endeavors. Oroonoko is a figure that enlivens her written pursuits, and his 
presence in her garden allows her to engage with a male freethinker. It is possible that 
what the narrator wants to preserve is not Oroonoko’s life or even dignity in the mind of 
the reader, but his structural commentary on the blindness of following Christian-
institutionalized beliefs. Though she does not attempt to save his body, the narrator well-
documents the ways in which Oroonoko destabilizes what the narrator and the white 
community assume to be true. In this way, the narrator’s apathy toward Oroonoko’s 
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corporeal salvation suggests that the ideology of Oroonoko was much more important to 
Behn in writing this novella than Oroonoko as an actual character. 
 
Oroonoko as Lucretian Figure 
Though few believe the account of Oroonoko to be factual as Behn attempts to 
persuade us, the narrator’s absence from, yet detailed account of, Oroonoko’s death is a 
moment in which Behn’s fluctuating narrative voice gives away that he is a creation of 
her own imagination. The question is, for what purpose? Behn creates Oroonoko as an 
embodied Lucretian figure—not as Lucretius himself but as a model of Memmius. 
Memmius functions as Lucretius’ student whom he addresses within De Rerum Natura. 
Throughout the ancient text, Lucretius works to purge the young student from the fear of 
death so that Memmius may enter into a state of “ataraxia”—which entails a fearlessness 
towards the afterlife and death. Memmius is Lucretius’ hoped-for legacy. Lucretius calls 
to him at the start of the text:  
Thee do I crave a co-partner in that verse  
Which I presume on Nature to compose  
 For Memmius mine, whom thou hast will to be  
 Peerless in grace at every hour- 
 Wherefore indeed, Divine one, give my words  
 Immortal charm.  (Lucretius I. 25-29). 
Despite Memmius’ presence in Lucretius’ text, he never achieves this pure state of 
“ataraxia”, falling into human passion that Lucretius often condemns.26 This essay has 
                                                          
26 It has been suggested that, due rather abrupt ending of De Rerum Natura with the 
description of the fire and death of the plague of Athens, that Lucretius’ text is left 
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already established the many moments in which Oroonoko purports ideals that are 
reminiscent of Lucretian philosophy. In addition to his Romanization and Epicurean 
echoes, Oroonoko’s friendship with both his French tutor and Behn’s avatar emulate the 
relationship between Memmius and his teacher, Lucretius.  
At first glance, the inclusion of the French tutor seems utilitarian. Behn would 
benefit from explaining how this African prince has such a deep knowledge of the 
language, practices, and histories of the Western world. Yet, Behn’s decision to bring this 
French tutor to Surinam suggests an inclusion of the French freethinking tradition to her 
novella. Her intention with the French tutor is made particularly clear when it is 
discovered that he holds philosophies so problematic that she eventually must remove 
him from the narrative.  
At this point in Behn’s career, she was deeply interested in French libertine 
thought. As will be developed later in this paper, Behn’s translations provide an English 
contemporary point of view to late seventeenth-century French libertinism. The 
Frenchman is, from the start, closely connected to Oroonoko’s education. Behn praises 
Oroonoko’s care of his army as he is promoted to general during his career in West 
Africa, with the tutor as a source of his moral fiber:   
Some part of [his character] we may attribute to the care of a Frenchman of wit 
and learning, who finding it turn to very good account to be a sort of royal tutor to 
this young black, and perceiving him very ready, apt and quick of apprehension, 
                                                          
unfinished. This would potentially explain Memmius’ failure to realize and carry on his 
master’s teachings. However, other scholars read the end of De Rerum Natura as a true 
testament to the chaos and futility of humanity’s attempts to immortalize themselves—




took great pleasure to teach him morals, language and science, and was for it 
extremely beloved and valued by him. (Oroonoko 14) 
Just as the tutor is introduced in this passage unnamed, he remains so throughout the 
novella—a shadowy figure that never speaks but is almost always present in the first half 
of the text.  
 As with Lucretius and Memmius, Oroonoko and the Frenchman operate under a 
mentor-mentee relationship. Their relationship is close enough that the narrator draws 
attention to the fact that Oroonoko is fluent in both English and French. While 
Oroonoko’s proficiency in English is fostered by his trade relations with the British 
businessmen, his only interaction with French speakers is with his tutor. For him to 
achieve this fluency, his relationship to the Frenchman must have been lengthy and 
intimate. Behn is clear about the profound influence that the Frenchman has on the young 
general around the time of his betrayal to the white slave traders. It is revealed shortly 
prior to their capture that the Frenchman is so closely tied to Oroonoko that he is there to 
support him through the transaction and eventual capture. Behn refers to him here as the 
“French governer he had from his childhood” and yet again stresses that he is “a man of 
admirable wit, great ingenuity and learning, all which he had infused into his young 
pupil” (35). The mention of Oroonoko’s education serves no clear plot point here, except 
perhaps to reinforce the educational status of the new slave in the face of his capture.  
 Yet, it is just as likely that Behn puts the elusive Frenchman in this scene of 
forced westward departure to physically symbolize Oroonoko’s transport of French and 
Lucretian libertinism to the English-colonized Surinam. Indeed, when Behn 
acknowledges the Frenchman’s presence, she also provides the reader with essential 
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background information: “This Frenchman was banished out of his own country from 
some heretical notions he held; and though he was a man of very little religion, he had 
admirable morals and a brave soul” (35). The Frenchman, thus, becomes the embodiment 
of a libertine. He is, in essence, the pedagogical source of Oroonoko’s anti-religious 
doubts. The Frenchman, if he were to have taught Oroonoko about Western culture as 
intimately as the narrator suggests, is certain to have imparted his own religious 
skepticism, which, in turn, the hypocrisy of the Surinam Christians confirms.  
 It is crucial then that the Frenchman is captured with the West Africans. Behn sets 
the kidnapping scene by reminding the reader of the tutor’s presence. When the white 
captain arrives, “Oroonoko [is] extremely delighted, at who met him on the shore, 
attended by his French governor, Jamoan, Aboan and about a hundred of the nobles 
youths of the court” (37). Oroonoko brings with him his peers and advisors. The 
Frenchman is the odd man out in age and ethnonational background. This racial and age 
distinction does not prevent him from the kidnapping. After Oroonoko gets drunk on the 
white tradesman’s boat, he is captured, and “[t]he same treachery was used to all the rest; 
and all in one instant the several places of the ship, were lashed fast in irons and betrayed 
the slavery. That great design over, they set all hands to work to hoist the sail” (37). That 
the libertine tutor sets sail to Surinam, a place dominated by Anglo-Christians, suggests 
that Behn wishes to bring libertinism physically to the Christianized Western sphere. 
Furthermore, due to his exile at the hands of the white-dominated French court and 
subsequent capture by the English tradesmen, the Frenchman embodies the hostility that 
is directed towards libertine thinkers in the European intellectual community and literally 
is placed in the same boat as those who are made slaves due to their skin color.  
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 However, Behn clearly recognizes that though the Frenchman is treated 
disdainfully for his connection to the West African peoples and freethinking spheres, he 
is not subject to the same oppression as Oroonoko. The English captain’s conflict in 
regards to what to do with his French captive perfectly delineates between the 
Frenchman’s status and that of Oroonoko’s. Oroonoko not only questions the “word of a 
Christian” following the captain’s betrayal, but also inspires a hunger strike among his 
fellow captives:  
The captain pondering and consulting what to do, it was concluded that nothing 
but Oroonoko’s liberty would encourage any of the rest to eat, except the 
Frenchman, whom the captain could not pretend to keep prisoner, but only told 
him, he was secured because he might act something in favour of the prince, but 
that he should be freed as soon as they came to land. (39).  
The Frenchman is liaison here to the white settlers. His skin tone and national 
background permit him to speak on behalf of his pupil in spite of his student’s insistence 
on doubting and demonizing the religious framework of the captain’s homeland. Just as 
the Frenchman speaks for and inspires the anti-religious rhetoric of Oroonoko, Behn 
inspires and writes the anti-religious rhetoric Oroonoko speaks. It is through Oroonoko as 
a mouthpiece that Behn is able to reiterate her own philosophical sentiments that can be 
traced throughout her poetry, essays, and translational work.  
 Behn’s narrator never truly meets the Frenchman in scene, yet references him one 
last time in a curious moment just before she meets Imoinda (Clemene) after her reunion 
with Caesar:  
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I was as impatient to make these lovers a visit, having already made a friendship 
with Caesar, and from his own mouth learned what I have related which was 
confirmed by his Frenchman who was set on shore to seek his fortune, and of 
whom they could not make a slave, because a Christian. (47) 
Throughout the first half of the novel, Behn conflates the philosophical principles of 
teacher and student, so much so that the two’s ideologies only become distinguishable in 
terms of racial perception when confronted with white Christianity. Though the 
Frenchman has been exiled for “heretical notions”, his status as a libertine is legitimized 
because of his European roots. Christianity thus becomes not a belief but an 
ethnonational, masculinized identity to wield power and moral authority without 
necessarily having grounds to do so (as Behn would say, “the Secure Retreat of a routed 
Argument”). Behn continues to showcase through Oroonoko the inherent hypocrisy in the 
Christian colonizers—in fact, one could argue that the entire novella is structured to 
prove such. Though it is said that the Frenchman “came daily to Parnham Hill to see and 
pay his respects to his pupil prince”, he is still free, able to wield his intellectual ideals in 
the realm of the white world once again—through and because of the social status of his 
student (47). Thus, the dangers of confronting a libertine depends on the person’s 
position within the dominant culture, and indeed, the differences in treatment between 
Oroonoko and the Frenchman closely resemble the same disparities Behn explicates in 
her treatment of her own intellectual exclusion.  
In the same sentence in which the Frenchman disappears towards freedom, the 
narrator begins to stress her kinship with the new slave. While the Frenchman, in the 
Eden-like West Africa, serves as the Lucretius to Oroonoko’s Memmius, this role is 
Lesley 54 
 
supplanted by an Epicurus-Lucretius relationship in the locus of the narrator’s garden in 
Surinam. Though it is suggested that the relationship is ongoing between the French tutor 
and his pupil, Behn never includes the Frenchman in the garden. Just like the narrator, the 
tutor is entirely absent when Oroonoko’s body is threatened but, like the narrator, 
remains crucially invested in the preservation of his story and ideals.  
Behn often corroborates events in Oroonoko’s life in West Africa through 
qualifiers such as, “which was confirmed by his Frenchman” (47). In doing so, the 
Frenchman and the narrator become co-authors of Oroonoko’s journey with the tutor 
covering the first half and the narrator covering the second. They retain the intellectual 
impression of Oroonoko, but not the corporeal Oroonoko. That the narrator replaces the 
Frenchman’s the role as Oroonoko’s educator in religious skepticism further imitates 
Behn’s real-life preoccupation with French freethought. She would translate French 
freethinkers frequently in the 1680s. Just as Behn’s narrator carries on the French 
skeptical tradition in English-colonized Surinam, so does Behn, as translator and critic, 
carry on the French skeptical tradition in England.   
  Oroonoko appears to embody this tradition of theological doubt quite well. His 
speeches against Christianity are indicative of the questions facing religious faith in late 
seventeenth-century western European Christianity, and much of his discourse resembles 
the rhetoric of doubt found within Lucretius’ writing. In certain regards, Oroonoko 
appears to reach a state of ataraxia by the end of the novella. He does not fear the 
repercussions of the afterlife much in the way Lucretius sought to inspire Memmius. 
Oroonoko’s particularly brutal death is punctuated by his seeming ease:  
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[W]ith an ill-favoured knife, they cut his ears and his nose, and burned them; he 
still smoked on, as if nothing had touched him. Then they hacked off one of his 
arms, and still he bore up, and held his pipe. But at the cutting off the other arm, 
his head sunk, and his pipe dropped, and he gave up the ghost without a groan or 
reproach. (76)  
His ability to mask his pain and fear at the hands of his captors truly embodies Lucretian 
ideals of acceptance of death. Though she remains coy about the details of his physicality 
in other portions of the text, Behn does not shy away from the gruesomeness of his 
murder, as though to prove Oroonoko a stoicized Epicurean. 
 Alma Massaro argues in her essay on Lucretian ideals of ataraxia that this 
fearlessness towards death creates a sort of sympathy in Lucretian thought for the animal. 
Animals preserve their bodies but do not fear death nor have notions of an afterlife. 
Massaro writes, “Humans…ignoring the laws of nature, spend a great part of their lives 
caring about things…which are extraneous to the Epicurean ideal of ataraxia; in contrast, 
animals, being faithful to the laws of nature, are completely devoid of these anxieties” 
(Massaro 46). Indeed, Behn attempts to draw parallels among Oroonoko, animals, and 
natural law.  
Oroonoko speaks to the laws of nature with confidence, citing “that honour was 
the first principle in Nature that was to be obeyed”. (Oroonoko 62). He also, upon the 
death of Imoinda, takes on the form of an unnamed animal. Behn writes that in his grief, 
“he roared like some monster of the wood, calling on the loved name of Imoinda” (72). 
Katherine Acheson notes that Behn portrays Oroonoko as “both perceived and perceiver, 
animal and human”, and his “stirring speech about the degradation of his people as badly 
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treated animals, and his own horrifying vivisection at the end of the story—dramatize the 
contradictions between the modes of representing animals that Behn inventories in the 
novel” (9). Oroonoko’s transformative connection to the realm of the animal suggests an 
interspecies fluidity that has roots in Lucretian philosophy. As Massaro notes, in De 
Rerum Natura Lucretius posits a highly non-anthropocentric view of interspecies 
hierarchy because all life is made of the same matter—atoms.  
 Lucretius frequently compares and conflates the animal and the human. For 
example, he calls upon Memmius to be an animalistic hunter in his pursuit of higher 
reasoning:  
 As dogs full oft with noses on the ground,  
 Find out the silent lairs, though hid in brush,  
 Of beasts, the mountain-rangers, when but once  
 They scent the certain footsteps of the way,  
 Thus thou thyself in themes like these alone  
 Can hunt from thought to thought, and keenly wind  
 Along even onward to the secret places 
 And drag out truth. (Lucretius I.398-417) 
Similar non-anthropocentric images appear throughout De Rerum Natura. For instance, 
Lucretius posits similarities between domesticated animal pleasure and female sexual 
pleasure with a husband. He denotes animal’s and human’s shared ability to express 
emotions, develop intelligence, and display anxieties. Even Lucretius’ creation story 
provides agency to Nature as a generative, intelligent being. Nature creates the world by 
its own power and will in a highly feminized way—the world hatches from Nature’s 
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womb. Lucretius closes his creation story with a non-anthropocentric statement: “For all 
things grow and gather strength through time / In like proportions” (V.819-820). In many 
ways, Lucretius sees human evolution towards vanity and power as a regression, while 
animals’ ability to embrace their fate leads to a higher understanding and acceptance of 
their mortality.27  
Yet, Oroonoko is not a true Lucretian, and it is through Behn’s Romanization of 
Oroonoko that she demonstrates the highly incompatible relationship between Roman 
qualities and Lucretian philosophy. Epicureanism, manifest in Lucretius, is decidedly 
anti-romance, apolitical, and anti-militarism, whereas Oroonoko’s embodiment of Roman 
ideals encompasses all of these characteristics. For example, before they reach Surinam, 
Oroonoko and Imoinda’s love story resembles something of a Greek or Roman comedy. 
An old king, described as “jealous to the last degree” of the young prince’s appeal, seeks 
to conquer Imoinda through rape which is protected by his legal immunity (27). Through 
trickery, her chastity remains intact, and she returns untouched to her young lover. The 
narrative closely resembles a plot by the famous Roman playwrights, Plautus or Terence.  
The young lovers even speak in terms of Roman romantic dialogue. In their passionate 
but private betrothal, Behn writes, “After a thousand assurances of his lasting flame and 
her eternal empire over him, she condescended to receive him for her husband; or rather, 
received him as the greatest honour the gods could do her” (18). Certainly, Behn could be 
referencing the polytheistic traditions of Africa, but even so, such pagan parallels draw 
Oroonoko and Imoinda closer to the Roman mythical tradition than to the monotheistic 
                                                          
27 This is certainly not to suggest that Behn’s portrayal of Oroonoko as animalistic is not 
extremely problematic in a “favorable” reading of her text. However, this is to suggest 
that there are multiple implications of such treatment.  
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framework of the English colonizers.28 In referencing both the pagan and the imperial 
themes of Roman devotion, Behn creates a language that places their love story within 
the Western classical tradition.  
Through this narrative, Imoinda is Romanized as well. Her dedicated chastity is 
reminiscent of Roman standards of pudicitia29, and her virginal status is often described 
in the terms of Roman gods, not Christian. For instance, when noting the white men’s 
unsuccessful attempts to sleep with her, Trefry details her refusal “as if she feared a rape 
even from the God of Day” (Oroonoko 45). The “God of Day” of course is in reference to 
Apollo. Not only does this allusion directly relate to Roman mythology, but it distances 
Imoinda from the Eve-like parallels established in her previous sexual interactions in the 
garden of West Africa.30 She becomes, in Surinam, not figure of Eve, but instead, of a 
Lucretia or a Leda. Crucially, she does not fully resemble these Roman women’s 
narratives until after she enters the Christianized world.  
Just as the Western world attempts “overthrow” Imoinda’s African identity, 
Oroonoko becomes all the more obsessed with conquering as an imitation of Western 
habits of violence. Though Lucretius asserts an equality between man and animal, in 
Surinam Oroonoko is decidedly a conqueror of both the animal and human world. The 
                                                          
28 Janet Todd in her marginalia for her edition of Oroonoko notes that “[t]he religions of 
West Africa… tended to assume a supreme being, but more important were the lesser 
powers associated with a particular local natural phenomena” (84). However, Todd also 
notes that Behn might not have drawn on West African notions of deities at all, but from 
classical mythology.  
29 Pudicitia was the Roman ideal of female behavior in domestic and public spheres. It 
was not only concerned with the virginity of women, but the way they dressed, their legal 
status, and their marital prospects. Pudicitia could only be awarded to women from the 
higher echelons from society.  
30 Imoinda and Oroonoko are introduced as pre-fallen beings, dressed “as Adam and Eve 
did the fig-leaves” and in “the first state of innocence, before man knew how to sin” (11).  
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narrator makes quite the show of his hunting capabilities. In a long and strange section of 
the book, Behn notes Oroonoko’s arrogance in his ability to conquer what the 
Englishmen cannot. Though he does succumb to its sting, he gawks at the notion that “a 
man could lose his force at the touch of an [electric eel]”, and though he does succumb to 
shocks, he still holds onto the fish, which they eat for supper (Oroonoko 55).  
Similarly, not once but twice does Oroonoko conquer a tiger. The first he kills by 
running a spear through its breast—an act read as a defense of the community. His 
obsession with surmounting the second tiger proves him more sportsman than protector. 
The Surinam people rumor of a tiger that many have failed to kill even after shooting it 
with bullets. When Caesar hears of this, “he had a mind to encounter this monster, and 
spoke with several gentlemen who had attempted her” (53). It is a goal which he 
achieves. The tiger’s graphic death requires that Oroonoko wait for the tiger to become 
satiated after eating a sheep. When the tiger is languid, Oroonoko shoots it twice through 
the eye. The blow kills the tiger. His rather theatrical production after his success imitates 
a militaristic showcase after a war. When he discovers that the tiger survived despite 
having “seven bullets of lead in [the heart]”, Oroonoko cuts out the heart and brings it to 
the village, “which [gave] Caesar occasion of many fine discourses, of accidents in war 
and strange escapes” (54-55).  
Oroonoko’s understanding of the Western world is not limited to hunting and 
romance but also includes a Roman understanding of militarized rebellion. Oroonoko 
openly frames his rebellion under the model of Roman military history. Behn writes, “he 
told them, that he had heard of one Hannibal, a great captain, had cut his way through 
mountains of solid rocks” (63). In addition, the slave that is most vocal in his support of 
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Oroonoko’s revolt is named Tuscan. Tuscan is described as “a tall Negro of some more 
quality than the rest”; thus his stature among the slaves accredits him with his Roman 
name (63). He “bow[s] at the feet of Caesar”, and though he questions the sanity of 
Oroonoko’s plans, he supports him in the end—a political alliance that allows for 
Oroonoko to acquire a military (64). 
 In contrast, Lucretius mocks man’s dotage, even in sleep, on what he wishes to 
master. In sleep, Lucretius writes, man seeks to conquer in a different way, as the 
“Commanders they to fight and go at frays, / Sailors to live in combat with the winds” 
(Lucretius IV.1197-1198). He characterizes man’s need to overcome others as folly:  
 Thus all pursuits  
 All arts in general seem in sleeps to mock  
 And master the minds of men. And whosoever  
 Day after day for long to games have given  
 Attention undivided, still they keep… 
 Those games with their own sense, open paths  
 Within the mind wherethrough the idol-films  
 Of those games came come. (IV.1203-1210).  
Significantly, this same passage, which captures Lucretian antagonism towards the 
“games” or “idol-films” of human ambition, compares these pursuits to a dog that barks 
at night or a horse that moves it hooves in a faux-chase. Yet again, Lucretius repudiates 
human senses of superiority and equates humanity to animals. Oroonoko’s pursuit of 
such “games” makes him an unruly student and not a master Epicurean. Indeed, 
Oroonoko’s need to overcome the domain of the animal soon foreshadows his later 
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rebellion to establish equity with the white population. Like Behn and Lucretius, 
Oroonoko must address a civil war. After he is unable to argue himself out of bondage 
through discourse with the white slave owners, he is reduced to violent rebellion that is 
far outside the Lucretian model.  
 Lucretius charges Memmius to avoid involvement in combat. He urges him: “Lull 
to a timely rest, / O’er sea and land the savage works of war, / For thou alone hast power 
with public peace / To aid mortality” (Lucretius I.1210-1213). Lucretius’ advice is highly 
topical. Memmius was an elite Roman aristocrat who was implicated in an ongoing civil 
war. Other than this, he is a vague figure in Roman history, more noted for his 
fictionalized role in Roman philology than his political prowess. He was, however, a 
powerful Roman politician who profited from militarized conflict. Why Lucretius 
chooses him remains a mystery—other than perhaps to play the part of the unwilling 
participant.  
Though Memmius functions within the text as a crucial example of one outside of 
the Lucretian ideal, he is only mentioned a handful of times in Books I, II, and V and 
remains entirely absent from the final Book VI. Lucretius draws the reader’s attention to 
some tension between the master and student after Memmius dimisses certain doctrines. 
Memmius is accused of falling asleep during Lucretius’ lessons of vacuity and atomism 
from the very start of the book, and in Book V, Lucretius appears to harbor resentment 
towards the student:   
 Memmius, first consider sea, earth and sky…. 
 One day will see them all go, after so many years  
 And the whole mechanical giant will fall to pieces.  
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 It does not escape me that this news will astonish you;  
 You will hardly credit that heaven and earth with vanish 
 And I shall find it hard to find the words to persuade you. (V.91-96) 
Through this, Lucretius considers his teachings to be unsuccessful. Thus, there is a self-
consciousness and a near loneliness to this passage. Though Lucretius’ own philosophy is 
practiced in an insulated environment, Lucretian philosophy does not seem to be so easily 
practiced by men with responsibilities to or investment in larger society. W. R. Johnson 
sees this strained student-teacher dynamic as a means to explore issues in the practice of 
education: “Memmius is, at one level, a symbol of the difficulty of being instructed, and 
his failures remind us that listening is a difficult art” (Johnson 9). Yet, Lucretius seems to 
view Memmius, not as a tool to comment on the educational process but rather a figure 
who can bring Epicureanism to a larger populace with his vast sociopolitical influence. 
Memmius embodies, instead, Lucretius’ failed Epicurean proselytizing.  
 Behn’s account of Oroonoko is then similar to the portrait of Memmius in De 
Rerum Natura. Just as Memmius to some extent listens to Lucretius’ teachings, 
Oroonoko observes the hypocrisies and incongruencies of Christian faith and practice as 
a student of Western civilization. In spite of his inferior status, he has the ability to 
captivate his white audience in a way that gains him prestige—until his questioning goes 
too far. Like Memmius, Oroonoko seems to reject Lucretian thought when it is not 
conducive to his real-life circumstances. Oroonoko is able to gain sociopolitical influence 
from a community in which he is otherwise excluded through his superhuman hunting of 
eels and tigers; in order to avoid a civil war, Oroonoko would have to accept his bondage. 
Epicureanism is thus incompatible with Oroonoko’s circumstances, just as they are with 
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Memmius’. The two men’s choice to exit the Lucretian model—as Memmius does with 
his disappearance from Book VI and Oroonoko does with his second act rebellion—
represents the failures of the socially involved Epicurean.  
Through the fictional vehicle of Oroonoko, Behn speculates about freethought in 
a rich and imaginative way. In bringing a male skeptic to her narrator’s garden, she 
recreates the Epicurean-Lucretian traditional discourse and makes herself the 
administrator of it. In fictionalizing Christian hypocritical actions, she legitimizes her 
anti-religious sentiments which are enunciated by the character of the racial other. In 
placing a Lucretian figure in situations of war, bondage, and betrayal, she juxtaposes 
ideology and reality. Oroonoko’s (and perhaps by extension Memmius’) failure to truly 
embody the Epicurean ideal does not, as Behn sees it, refute their status as philosophers. 
Through their questioning of Lucretian essentialism, they provide another form of 
intellectual skepticism. Behn does not fall into absolutes such as liberalism/conservatism, 
atheism/theism, etc. but rather celebrates the diversity of thought brought forth from 
discourse. Though she celebrates Lucretian atomism, what she seems most 
commendatory of is Lucretian skepticism—that is an openness to questioning such 
absolutes. Oroonoko’s dual role as both challenger to and champion of Epicureanism 
gives Behn the opportunity to also challenge and champion.  
 
Biblical Accommodation and Spiritual Doubt in Essay on Translated 
Prose 
 Behn’s interest in the Epicurean continues with her translation of Fontenelle’s 
Entretiens sur la pluralite des mondes (Discovery of New Worlds). Published in France in 
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1686, Fontenelle’s treatise on the possibility of many worlds, particularly one on the 
moon, is reflective of the Epicurean principle of an infinite universe. Behn certainly was 
preoccupied with Epicurus at the time: she published this translation in 1688—the same 
year that she wrote Oroonoko.31 Though the text she translates is centered on a defense of 
the existence of multiple inhabited worlds, Behn’s preface, “Essay on Translated Prose”, 
largely responds in support of Fontenelle’s secondary argument for Copernican systems 
of the universe.  
While Behn and Fontenelle do not directly reference the Epicurean tradition in 
their texts, Fontenelle’s discussion of plural inhabitable worlds and this discussion’s 
location in a garden certainly bring to mind the Epicurean. As Behn relies upon the 
gender-inclusivity of the Epicurean garden in her work with the pastoral intellectual 
community in both Oroonoko and “To the Unknown Daphnis”, Fontenelle’s A Discovery 
of New Worlds places a woman at the center of his garden discourses. At the beginning of 
“The Third Night”, Fontenelle (translated by Behn) writes, “We [The Lady Marquiese 
and I] did not fail to go that Evening into the Park, which was now become a place 
consecrated to our Philosophical Entertainment” (Fontenelle 125). Behn, in fact, lists the 
inclusion of Lady Marquiese “as one of the speakers in these five discourses” as 
“Motive…for [her] to undertake this little work” (“Essay” 73). Perhaps Behn’s growing 
intellectual interest in the Epicurean garden and women inside such a community 
contributed to the quick turn-around from Fontenelle’s original publication to Behn’s 
                                                          
31 Behn also published in 1688 a translation of another work by Fontenelle, his l’Histoire 
des Oracles (The History of Oracles). Both History of Oracles and Discovery of New 
Worlds would prove to be faithful translations, except that Behn would often correct 
certain errors made in Fontenelle’s text.   
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English edition. Moreover, Behn’s inclusion of the complex and topical “Essay on 
Translated Prose” suggests that she, inspired by Lady Marquiese’s philosophical inquiry, 
was willing to enter the garden not as a fictionalized character, but as herself.  
 
Behn as a Critical Reader 
 Certainly, Behn’s decision to promulgate her own philosophy in the text is rather 
radical. Scholars such as Elizabeth Scott-Baumann argue that women in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century entered a larger philosophical context through the reading of their 
male counterparts’ work. For instance, Scott-Baumann in her book Forms of 
Engagement: Women, Poetry and Culture, 1640-1680 hypothesizes that women writers 
like Hutchinson, Cavendish, and Philips “used their own reading to engage with their 
readers. By alluding to Donne or invoking contemporary philosophy, they initiate a 
dialogue with their readers about current and historical literary culture” (Scott-Baumann 
15). However, the book does not include a thorough study of Behn’s writings on 
theological and philosophical controversy of the seventeenth century. Indeed, Behn does 
not seem to follow exactly the model of readership that Scott-Baumann suggests is true 
for other Restoration female writers. Though Behn is an astute reader and advertises her 
own thoughts in reference to her fellow writers, her engagement with others’ texts is not 
just an attempt to gain clout. Behn clearly saw her role as a reader as that of a close critic. 
This dialogue is not just to enter into the conversation, but to shift it.  
Behn, as translator, views herself as the text’s most intimate reader and analyst. 
Though she appreciates A Discovery of New Worlds enough to make it accessible to the 
English philosophical community, she does so with one crucial caveat: even she as 
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translator criticizes the text in her prefatory material. Behn lists her grievances of 
Fontenelle’s book, which include his treatment of the Lady Marquiese’s intelligence, his 
apathy towards theological modes of thinking, and, as she sees it, the occasionally 
unfounded radicalness of his arguments. However, Fontenelle is only one of many of 
Behn’s colleagues who are closely examined in “Essay on Translated Prose”. Indeed, 
scholar Line Cottegnies captures the literary critical importance of Behn’s translation and 
of this essay. She agrees that Behn’s preface was not just a reading of Fontenelle but “a 
new, exciting philosophical contribution to the debate about Copernicanism, refuting 
Father Tacquet and others” (Cottegnies 24). Even more strikingly, she declares it “the 
earliest theoretical text on prose translation in English” (24). Thus, Behn’s essay is not 
just a close literary study of the content of her colleagues but also of the form and 
practice of translation.  
Of course, just because the text broke ground on prose translational theory does 
not mean it existed in isolation—even this essay was in response to Behn’s reading of 
another text: “An Essay on Translated Verse” by the Earl of Roscommon (1630-1685).32 
The latter text was printed in 1684 by the same publisher as Behn, Jacob Tonson. Behn 
proves herself unafraid to critique writers under the same publisher—she will be shown 
to do this again with her satire of Thomas Creech. In his essay, Roscommon praises 
French translations but stresses the importance and even need for the English to gain 
ground on this process. He is rather insistent on British elitism in this genre. Sixteen 
                                                          
32 The Earl of Roscommon (also known as Wentworth Dillon) was a notable writer and 
thinker of the seventeenth century. His “Essay on Translated Verse” was recommended 
by John Dryden, who wrote the foreword to the piece shortly before its publication. 
Roscommon was a celebrated Latin translator, most notably for his translation of 
Horace’s Ars Poetica, which he published in 1680.   
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years earlier, John Dryden had penned a similar praise of poetry translated into English in 
his Essay on Dramatic Poesy (1668). Conversations around issues of translation become 
ubiquitous in writings throughout the Restoration period. Janet Todd suggests in her 
preface to Behn’s “Essay on Translated Prose” that this flourish of essays indicates that 
translation “was…controversial in its practice and in its results”, given the intense and 
fluctuating sociopolitical and religious climate of the second half of the seventeenth 
century (“Textual Introduction” viii).  
A frequent verse translator herself, Behn had the resume to deem verse or prose 
the harder of the two; however, she chooses to focus on which of the languages are the 
hardest to translate whether it be in prose or verse. She discusses in depth the difficulty of 
translating French instead of Latin—an exercise that she, not Roscommon, undertook. In 
drawing the readers’ attention to a practice in which she has proven herself more adept 
than Roscommon, Behn establishes a level of authority over her counterpart.33 Where he 
surmounts her in Latin, she surmounts him in French. To Behn, her translations are much 
more challenging than his. Indeed, the first argument Behn makes in her essay is not that 
prose is more difficult to translate but that the “French therefore is of all the hardest to 
translate into English” (74). Her argument is primarily based on what appears to be a 
deep linguistic study into the origins of the different Western languages. This study 
                                                          
33 As mentioned before, Behn’s poem, “To the Unknown Daphnis on His Excellent 
Translation of Lucretius”, stresses the author’s frustration with her limited access to 
Latin. She openly did not know the language. That she celebrates and asserts a level of 
difficulty in her understanding of French above that of Latin places her skill as a 
translator as equal to that of her male contemporaries. Moreover, Behn seems to suggest 
that her translations of French works are not just more difficult for the language 
disparities, but that, unlike many Latin texts, there was no English predecessor on which 
to base her translation in the first place.  
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concludes not the superiority of the English language, as Roscommon’s does. Instead, 
Behn offers a critique of the English and French languages, particularly in their equal 
bastardization of Latin:  
 French Authors take a liberty to borrow whatever Word they want from the Latin  
without farther Ceremony, especially when they treat of Sciences. This the 
English do not  
do, but at second hand from the French. It is Modish to Ape the French in 
everything: Therefore, we not only naturalize their words, but words they steal 
from other Languages. I wish in this and several other things, we had a little more 
of the Italian and Spanish humour. (75) 
In structuring her opening argument (and in titling her essay in a similar manner to 
Roscommon), she enters the conversation he opened in 1684. As such, she asserts her 
skill in translating French prose, rejects that English language as superior to others, and, 
by implication, quickly critiques her counterpart.  
 Behn achieves something similar in her criticism of the material within her own 
translation; however, she rebukes aspects of Fontenelle’s text more openly than in her 
treatment of Roscommon. Though she calls Fontenelle an “ingenious French author”, she 
still finds several flaws in A Discovery of New Worlds (“Essay” 76). Not only is Behn 
disgruntled by Fontenelle’s characterization of Lady Marquiese as “silly”, she is also 
dissatisfied with his theological and scientific rationale (76). On his argument that there 
must be many worlds, she writes, “[H]e hath pushed his wild Notion of Plurality of 
Worlds to that heighth of Extravagancy, that he most certainly will confound these 
Readers, who have not Judgment and Wit to distinguish between what is truly solid… 
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and what is trifling and airy” (77).34 She even states later that in her own analysis of the 
text, she will “not presume to defend his Opinion, but one may make a very good use of 
many things he hath expressed” (77). Even though this reflects a more conservative side 
to Behn’s thinking, it still demonstrates her respect and consideration of the full spectrum 
of liberal and conservative ideologies, while still examining all such theories with a 
skeptical eye.   
 Ironically, much of her skepticism towards Fontenelle is in relation to his 
exclusion of the divine from his text. Though much of her work (particularly in that of 
Oroonoko and “To the Unknown Daphnis”) supports reasoning without intrusion of 
religious principles, Behn changes her tone in this essay. She appraises that Fontenelle 
“ascribes all to Nature, and says not a Word of God Almighty, from the Beginning to the 
End; so that one would almost take him to be a Pagan” (“Essay” 77). In the wake of texts 
such as Oroonoko and Abdelazer, Behn’s claim that the absence of God in Fontenelle’s 
reasoning makes him “almost” an atheist or pagan seems rather contradictory. While 
Oroonoko and Abdelazer are accused of heresy, she defends Fontenelle’s faith if only to 
defend her own in the process. She writes that despite the absence of a divine figure in his 
text, “he gives a magnificent Idea of the vastness of the Universe, and of the almighty and 
infinite Power of the Creator, to be comprehended by the meanest Capacity” (77). Thus, 
Behn has carefully monitored her critique of Fontenelle. To translate a decidedly 
heterodox text would place her in the position that Lucy Hutchinson found herself in 
                                                          
34 One of the most criticized aspects of the text was Fontenelle’s assertion that “one day 
Men will be able to fly to the Moon”, as it was seen as sacrilegious to suggest that 
humans could leave earth (Fontenelle 123). Perhaps this is one of the “airy” or “trifling” 
aspects of Fontenelle’s text that Behn referenced. This idea is echoed by Wadham 
College alumna, John Wilkins, in his discourses on the moon.  
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during the 1650s and Creech during the 1680s upon translating Lucretius. Behn, 
Hutchinson, and Creech feel the need to justify their translation of radical text. “Essay on 
Translated Prose” at once distances Behn from the content of the source material while 
also suggesting that the original author is not as spiritually harmful as he may seem.  
Behn, thus, does not translate Fontenelle for his personal defense of the existence 
multiple worlds, but for the questions he raises about systems of the universes in doing 
so. She seems thrilled that scientific principles are being discussed outside of Latin, that a 
woman is included in the conversation, and that Fontenelle carries high prestige as an 
author internationally (73). Just as with Creech, Behn celebrates that the author has 
opened the dialogue to those that cannot read Latin, but she also recognizes that close 
intellectual relationships with philosophers of high merit provides her with the clout to 
access to the English free-thinking community.35  However, of utmost concern to Behn is 
how his line of reasoning leads to a brief defense of a pro-Copernican system.   
 Behn’s support of Copernicanism is largely concerned with countering the 
Biblical argument against heliocentrism. Just as she seems worried about the apparent 
atheism of Fontenelle, so too does she defend herself against charges that her theories of 
Biblical accommodation and Copernican systems of the universe go too far. As her model 
of controversy, she cites Thomas Burnet:  
I hope none will think my Undertaking too bold, in making so much use of the  
                                                          
35 Fontenelle also recognizes the novelty of his introduction of such principles and ideas 
in the French language. In his own preface to the work, he opens comparing himself to 
Cicero “when he undertook to put Matters of Philosophy into Latin; which, till that time, 
had never been treated of, but in Greek” (Fontenelle 87).  
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Scripture, on such an Occasion. I have a Precedent, much esteemed by all 
ingenious Men;  
that is, Mr. Burnet’s Book of Paradise, and Antedeluvian World, which 
incroaches as  
much, if not more, on the holy Scriptures. (“Essay” 85) 
Burnet was a famously provocative free-thinker and Biblical accommodationist. His text 
to which Behn is referring, Telluris theoria sacra (The Sacred Theory of the Earth), was 
published in 1684 to much criticism. The central theme of his treatise presses upon major 
issues within the current intellectual climate—how does one reconcile the growing 
scientific discoveries of a soon-to-be Enlightenment Age with the literal reading of the 
Holy Scriptures?  
 Burnet’s answer centers much on problems with the Biblical creation narrative. 
The Sacred Theory of the Earth argues principally that “the Earth arose from Chaos” and, 
rather than a literal understanding of the six-day creation story, that “the World had stood 
Six thousand years” during which it was being created (Burnet A2, 23). Burnet’s central 
claim is not to denounce a “Creator” but to encourage an alternative reading of the 
Bible—one that allows the Scriptures to stand alongside the growing scientific 
discoveries of the day. Each creation “day”, Burnet argues, was a thousand years. What 
would a thousand years matter to an eternal being? As for the “Chaos”, God is the author 
of such Chaos from which the earth arose. Behn appears to revere, or at the very least be 
intimately familiar with, the text and its contemporary reception. As with Fontenelle’s 
apparent heterodoxy, her understanding and opinion of Burnet is framed as an “almost”. 
She is willing to entertain Burnet’s philosophy, but she does not allow herself to go quite 
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that far. Thus, she critiques the discourse yet gives it space within her argument, all the 
while filling this essay with controversial statements of her own. 
 
 
Biblical Accommodation and Galileo  
 Regardless of how she tries to distinguish herself, Burnet’s argument resembles 
Behn’s within “Essay on Translated Prose”. Burnet’s theory is a perfect example of the 
theological principle of Biblical accommodation. According to intellectual historian, 
Stephen Benin, Biblical accommodation is rooted in necessity: “Divine 
accommodation/condescension alleges, most simply, that divine revelation is adjusted to 
the disparate intellectual and spiritual level of humanity at different times in human 
history” (xiv). This simple theorem manifests itself in many complex ways, particularly 
in the seventeenth century. To use the test case of Burnet: because humans cannot 
comprehend true cosmic chaos nor the process of creation over thousands of years, the 
writer of the Torah, for narrative comprehension’s sake, was divinely inspired to describe 
the creation process in a way that was accessible for human’s inferior, fallen minds. This 
understanding of the creation story, again, does not detract from God as Creator nor from 
the belief that the earth was created with a plan, but it does assert that, because of 
human’s inability to truly comprehend divine omnipotence, they receive a watered-down 
text. Thus, not all parts of the Bible can be taken literally.  
 While Benin traces the roots of accommodation through many early Christian, 
medieval, and early Renaissance texts (not limited to the Western canon), he notes an 
increased consideration of divine condescension in the era shortly before the 
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Enlightenment. Behn’s text is closely connected to this style of theological thought. She 
practically provides her own definition of divine accommodation in “Essay on Translated 
Prose” and rewords this same idea multiple times throughout the text. She explicates, 
“the Spirit of God has been so condescending to our Weakness, that through the whole 
Bible, when any thing of that kind is mentioned, the Expressions are always turned to fit 
our Capacities, and to fit the common Acceptance, or Appearances of things to the 
Vulgar” (“Essay” 79). Behn’s transition to Biblical translation follows an impressive 
strategy: by detailing how difficult it is to translate contemporary French and English, she 
enunciates how much more difficult the translation is from Hebrew and Greek to 
contemporary English, as well as the translation of ancient society’s scientific, 
intellectual framework to the seventeenth century. 
 She is inspired to speak of these challenges because of a passing mention of 
Fontenelle’s support of heliocentrism in Discovery of New Worlds. Before she allows 
herself to develop what will become a thorough inquiry into the nature of Biblical 
translation and the relationship between Scripture and science, Behn inserts a familiar 
disclaimer: “As to [systems of Copernicus], I cannot but take his part as far as a 
Woman’s Reasoning can go. I shall not venture upon the Astronomical part, but leave 
that to the Mathematicians” (“Essay” 78). The disclaimer reads as almost humorous. In 
the same paragraph, Behn introduces an argument to prove her case for Biblical 
accommodation which is entirely centered on her ability to understand and detail 
geometric, chronological, and astronomical principles that are incompatible with a literal 
Scriptural reading.  
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When concluding her analysis of disparities between Scriptures concerning the 
length of King Solomon’s reign, she boldly contradicts herself: “It is not my present 
Business to reconcile this difference; but I can easily do it; if any Body think it worth 
their Pains to quarrel with my Boldness, I am able to defend myself” (80). Behn not only 
reverses her previous shyness but presents her arguments as superior to her contesters. 
Her assertion of mathematical authority is supported by her intensely thorough dissection 
of the chronological, geometric, and astronomical fallacies in the Old Testament.  
Her astronomical discussions, which are foundational to her Scriptural defense of 
Copernicanism, can be somewhat derivative of her contemporaries. However, the 
precedent for her geometric and chronological questioning remains more obscure. Her 
mathematical and chronological inquiries are primarily in regards to passages in I Kings 
that provide details of King Solomon’s reign. For instance, in her example of geometrical 
inaccuracies, she refers to the construction details provided for the Temple of Solomon, 
particularly the “Dimensions of Solomon’s Molten Brass in 1 King. 7.23” (“Essay” 79). 1 
Kings 7:23 reads: “And he made a molten sea, ten cubits from the one brim to the other: 
it was round all about, and his height was five cubits: and a line of thirty cubits did 
compass it round about” (King James Version). To this, Behn replies in a fascinating 
display of research:  
That is to say, the Diameter of this Vessel was a Third of its Circumference: This 
is  
indeed commonly understood to be so, but is far from a Geometrical Exactness, 
and will  
not hold to a Mathematical Demonstration, as to the just Proportion between the  
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Diameter and Circumference of a Circle. (79) 
Somehow, Behn puts even more arithmetic effort towards her concern over 
inconsistencies in Solomon’s length of reign.36 This passage is a risky consideration of 
man-made error in the writing of the Bible. The Bible is not, to Behn, a flawless God-
breathed text, but one that was written by humans for humans. With this reading of the 
Bible, Behn appears not afraid to study the Scriptures as a work of divine condescension 
nor critique the inherent fallacies within certain scientific or chronological claims.  
Though he is the basis for her to launch into her own Biblical and scientific 
discoveries, Fontenelle’s theories are rarely listed as her source material. Rather, Behn 
primarily develops her argument from principles set forth by Galileo and Jesuit 
mathematician, Andreas Tacquet, who was also a French astronomer like Fontenelle. 
Though Galileo is never directly mentioned, Behn’s work almost undeniably draws 
inspiration from Galileo’s famous 1615 treatise, “Letter to the Madame Christina of 
Lorraine Grand Duchess of Tuscany: Concerning the Use of Biblical Quotations in 
Matters of Science”. Father Tacquet’s work, by contrast, is the text that she wishes to 
challenge.  
 Her choice to draw attention to Tacquet’s work is perhaps strategic. In an essay 
focused on disparities among translations of the Bible, it is best to respond to the author 
                                                          
36 The passage, though fascinating, is too lengthy to detail in this essay; however, it 
critiques the inaccuracies of 1 Kings 6.1 which reads:  
“And it came to pass in the four hundred and eightieth year after the children of 
Israel were come out of the land of Egypt, in the fourth year of Solomon’s reign 
over Israel, in the month of Zif, which is the second month, that he began to build 
the house of the Lord.” (King James Version) 
She analyzes this passage carefully with the number of years presented by Paul’s sermon 
in Acts. The scriptural incompatibility is detailed thoroughly.  
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whose language you best understand, and surely Father Tacquet’s French origins make 
him a topical example from which to pull in a preface to a French translation. Tacquet’s 
Opera Mathematica, which Behn likely read in French, is a multivolume work originally 
published in Antwerp in 1669.  In this text, Tacquet cites similar Scriptural passages that 
refute Galileo’s and other’s defense of the Scriptural validity of Copernicus’ system of 
the universe. The Bible verses that Tacquet analyzes are the same that Behn cites, placing 
“Essay on Translated Prose” in direct conversation with Opera Mathematica. She 
outlines, “In the end of this Treatise, he cites several Texts of Scripture; and particularly, 
the 19th Psalm, And the Sun standing still at the Command of Joshua” (“Essay” 78). The 
very title page of her translation advertises her rebuttal to Opera Mathematica and to her 
other male contemporaries. The title page promotes “Essay on Translated Prose” as a 
work “wherein the Arguments of Father Tacquet, and others, against the System of 
Copernicus (as to the Motion of the Earth) are likewise considered, and answered” 
(Fontenelle 71). This essay is thus firmly steeped in Behn’s role as a critical commentator 
not only on Copernican principles but also on systems of theological inquiry and Biblical 
interpretation.  
Behn delivers as advertised—the formulation of her essay, as she states, is in 
direct conversation with Tacquet’s Scriptural argument against Copernican theory. She 
begins her pro-heliocentric argument with a declarative position in opposition to Tacquet. 
Her aim is clear: “to make it appear that the two Texts cited by Father Tacquet…are at 
least as much for Copernicus and his System, as they are for Ptolemy’s” (“Essay” 82).  
As will be explored further in this text, Behn’s theory of Biblical accommodation and 
knowledge of astronomy and geometry aid her in dismantling his Scriptural argument. 
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However, as Scott-Baumann suggests about other women writers, Behn surrounds her 
argument with credible male sources that bolster her discursive potency and place her in 
close kinship with some of the great freethinkers.  
Throughout “Essay on Translated Prose”, Behn develops a vast bibliography 
spanning over a thousand years. This essay has already established her intellectual 
conversation with Father Tacquet, the Earl of Roscommon, Thomas Burnet, and 
Fontenelle, but Behn’s text demonstrates her vast reading list. In describing the natural 
phenomenon of whirlwinds, she cites Rene Descartes in that he “understands 
[whirlwinds] in a more general sense, and I call it a Whirling” (76). In regards to church 
history she points to the Bishop of Venice, Anthony Godeau, who reaffirms Behn’s 
assessment of the issues in chronology during Solomon’s reign. She assures readers that 
her reference to him “doth not remove the Difficulty, so well as what I have said” (82).  
She does not limit herself to contemporary thinkers, but also draws upon the first-
century Jewish historian, Josephus, who was frequently referenced in relation to 
historical accuracies (or inaccuracies) in the Bible. She draws him to the forefront again 
to stress the problems with accounts of Solomon’s reign: “Josephus says expressly, in the 
third Chapter of his eighth Book of Antiquities, that King Solomon reigned eighty Years, 
and died at the Age of ninety four” (81). She recognizes, however, how problematic it is 
for a Scriptural scholar (as she so posits herself to be) to cite Josephus in contradiction to 
the Scriptures, clarifying, “I would not presume to name this famous Historian in 
contradiction to the Holy Scriptures, if it were not easie to prove by the Scriptures, that 
Solomon reigned almost twice forty years” (81).  
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Yet, perhaps her closest intellectual relationship is not with a writer whom she 
names. Behn shows the most sympathy towards an argument by Galileo found in his 
“Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina”, which was widely circulated at the time Behn 
was writing her essay. In this treatise, Galileo argues for a Copernican cosmic system in 
response to the same Scriptures later studied by Father Tacquet. His principal thesis was, 
like Behn, that the Bible is accommodated for inferior human understanding and that the 
minutiae of translation allow for human error in copying and distribution. The subjects of 
the Bible, without accommodation, would be “matters infinitely beyond the 
comprehension of the common people” (Galileo 182). He bemoans his opinion that 
religious authorities “would have us altogether abandon reason and the evidence of our 
senses in favor of some biblical passage, though under the surface meaning of its words 
this passage may contain a different sense” (179). However, such a complaint does not 
diminish the supremacy and infallibility of the salvation narrative. These words greatly 
resemble Behn rejection of the blind acceptance of orthodox Christianity in both her 
poem to Creech and Oroonoko. The Baconian notion that scientific reasoning was given 
to humanity to decipher as another “Scriptural text” (i.e. nature) is found in Galileo’s and 
Behn’s work. Defense of heliocentrism thus was a defense not only of the principle of the 
sun as the center of the universe but also of scientific reasoning outside the constraints of 
religious doctrine.  
Similarly, Behn’s thesis, which manifests itself in a few mutated forms 
throughout the text, posits “that the design of the Bible was not to instruct Mankind in 
Astronomy, Geometry, or Chronology, but in the Law of God, to lead us to Eternal Life” 
(“Essay” 79). In a congruous manner, Galileo makes the claim “[t]hat the intention of the 
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Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven, not how heaven goes” (Galileo 186). 
Though Behn’s study is centered on issues of literal readings of Scripture that hinder 
human scientific progress, Galileo primarily defends the Biblical soundness of his 
support of Copernicus’ theory.  
Galileo wrote his treatise at a pivotal moment in his career—the astronomer’s 
mounting popularity accompanied mounting religious criticism. Galileo wrote his letter 
as a defense of his life in the wake of his vastly influential scientific texts; Behn wrote 
“Essay on Translated Prose” as an argument that her opinions should be influential on the 
freethinking community at all. These disparate contexts provide a framework that 
instigates a difference in approach: Behn discredits the extent of Biblical applicability 
much further than Galileo is willing in his letter. His is limited to astronomical matters; 
hers is a universal principle to be applied for nearly all readings of Scripture (excluding 
that of the Gospel salvation narrative). 
Indeed, Behn’s tone is almost agitated when she stresses her accommodationist 
theory, particularly when speaking of Tacquet’s interpretation of Psalms 19. In this 
passage thought to be written by David, the writer celebrates the “glory of God” which 
has covered “all the earth” (Psalm 19: 1, 4, King James Version). David continues, “In 
[the ends of the earth] hath he set a tabernacle for the sun, / Which is a bridegroom 
coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race” (Ps. 19:4b-5, 
KJV).  Father Tacquet argued in 1684 that this passage supports the Ptolemaic system in 
that the sun was situated for the earth. This tabernacle (or the sun), thus, emerges to “run” 
a race. In that, Tacquet and others claimed that David was insinuating the cosmological 
system in which the sun was set in motion to service the center of the universe—earth.  
Lesley 80 
 
Behn associates this passage with Scriptural studies that are too detailed and 
literal of readings and, as such, are inadequate and ineffectual. She attacks Tacquet and 
others’ literalist reading by asking a string of rhetorical questions: “That these words are 
Allegorical is most plain. Does not the Word Set impart stability, Fix’dness and Rest, as 
much as the Words run his Race, and come forth of his Chamber, do signifie motion or 
turning round?” (“Essay” 82). Behn’s strategy with her argument is not to plant certainty 
for Copernicus but doubt in the argument for Ptolemy. Indeed, she concedes, “For the 
Words of Scriptures favour one Opinion as much as the other” (82). Her analysis of the 
Psalm is short, and yet Behn places it before her discussion of a longer, more complicated 
passage in Joshua. Because of this, Tacquet’s argument is already in question before she 
arrives at Joshua’s miracle. 
The passage of primary concern for both Galileo and Behn in terms of Copernican 
theory is that of a miracle in the tenth chapter of the Old Testament book of Joshua. After 
Joshua has fought at Gilgal and won in Gibeon against Israel’s enemies, the Amorites, he 
seeks to prove that his victory was evidence that God was on the side of the Israelites. To 
do so, Joshua issues a command to the cosmos:  
Sun, stand thou upon still upon Gibeon; and thou, Moon, in the valley of Ajalon. 
And  
the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had avenged themselves 
upon  
their enemies…. So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go 
down  
about a whole day. And there was no day like that before or after it, that the Lord  
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hearkened unto the voice of man: for the Lord fought for Israel. (Joshua 10:12b-
14  
King James Version) 
Galileo’s central argument around this passage centers upon theories of Biblical 
accommodation in a way that Behn’s does not. This contrast is an ironic switch: the great 
scientist Galileo focuses primarily on a close textual reading, whereas Behn seeks to 
explain this miracle via her understanding of the systems of the moon and sun.37 
Just as Behn stresses that certain Biblical passages should be read as allegory, 
Galileo stresses that Joshua’s miracle was actually an act of accommodation. Galileo 
suggests that the scientific principles that allowed Joseph to accomplish this phenomenon 
were not explained fully so that the Israelites could understand it on their own miraculous 
terms. Galileo paints Joseph as a rhetorical conduit between God and his people, 
explaining, “But since his words were to be heard by people who very likely knew 
nothing of any celestial motions beyond the great general movement from east to west, he 
stooped to their capacity and spoke according to their understanding” (Galileo 211). 
Perhaps Behn would have agreed with Galileo’s take on the passage; she herself would 
claim later in “Essay on Translated Prose” that Christians should leave points of science 
“to the Opinion of the Learned” (“Essay” 85). However, Galileo places Joseph as the 
learned and the people as the followers—an interpretation which Behn does not 
necessarily reiterate.  
                                                          
37 To be sure, this does not eliminate the fact that Behn implores accommodationist theory 
in a similar manner when citing the allegorical nature of the aforementioned passage 
from Psalm 19. However, her separation from this theory and venture into more of the 
translational and scientific defenses for the passage of Joshua indicates a concerted effort 
to position herself as a natural philosopher.  
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Instead, Behn takes another approach, in which Joseph is not as intellectually 
privy to the celestial changes. His agency is stripped from the translational practice, and 
rather, the feminized Moon takes control of the miracle. For Behn, the Moon is the acting 
principle and moves “nearer to the Body of the Sun, as to appearance, so it could not 
assist the Children of Israel with Light, having so little of her own: It was then…that the 
Moon stood still; and for some other Reason that it is taken notice of in Holy Scripture” 
(“Essay” 83). Behn connects this miracle to the Moon—which was frequently 
anthropomorphized to have a connection with women’s bodily systems—and completely 
strips the male author from authorial or celestial agency. Not only does this place the 
feminized Moon in the place of agency, but also establishes Behn as the modern-day 
teacher of this discovery.   
Behn merges her scientific understandings with her other main concern—issues of 
translation. Much of her thesis on this passage in Joshua hinges on her own declared 
expertise in English translations of the Bible, particularly from Hebrew. Her assertion is 
sure and opens her argument for heliocentric affirmations in this miracle. She declares 
her preference for the “best Edition of the English Bible, which is printed in a small Folio 
by Buck, in Cambridge” (“Essay” 83). The edition she praises is a thoughtful 
reproduction of the original King James Bible, which was first printed in 1611. In 
response to those Puritans who disdained textual inexactitude in the original King James 
version, the Buck Bible was published in 1638. Just a cursory glance through the two 
editions demonstrates a much more concerted effort in the Buck edition to include 
thorough textual notes, many of which admit translational issues between the Hebrew or 
Greek original. Not only does the Buck Bible reference the parallels between pagan 
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Greek traditions and chronological enigmas, its prefatory material contains a detailed 
explanation of the issues with and historical processes of reproducing an ancient text in a 
non-ancient language. 
 In the very title page, the Buck Bible boasts that it is “[n]ewly translated out of 
the original tongues, and with former translations diligently compared and revised” (The 
Holy Bible). Because of the complicated history of Biblical translations, the Buck 
recognizes variants in meaning between different languages. This version celebrates the 
process of translation as an intellectual pursuit, stating that “there should be one more 
exact translation of the holy Scriptures into the English tongue” (ix). Thus, Behn’s 
attraction to this text is abundantly clear in the Buck Bible’s explanation of its 
translational process and its detailed marginalia. This edition is indeed so thorough that in 
his 2010 Bible: The Story of the King James Version, Gordon Campbell makes the same 
claim as Behn in 1688, when he cites “[t]he second Cambridge folio edition, printed in 
1638” as “probably the best of the Bibles produced in the seventeenth century” 
(Campbell 116). In addition, Campbell notes that this text was one of the most popular 
and standard English editions of the Bible until the Oxford version emerged in the middle 
of the eighteenth century. Certainly, Behn, at the end of the seventeenth century, saw the 
Buck Bible as a reliable scholarly source.38  
                                                          
38 Behn is not only concerned with English translations of Scripture. She also works into 
this text references to the Greek Bible, called the Septuagint. This edition of the Bible 
included the Apocrypha, unlike the King James Version. The title of the Bible, Behn 
notes, was named because it was said to be compromised from “seventy two Interpreters” 
(“Essay” 81). She uses the Septuagint to prove her thesis about the inexactitudes of the 
Bible’s claim of the duration of Solomon’s reign.  
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That Behn asserts an opinion on the quality of translations of the Bible at all is 
fascinating when in conjunction with her theory of divine accommodation. Not only is 
she willing to critique the English version of the Bible, she is also willing to assert the 
authority to differentiate among the various English editions. However, she references the 
Buck Bible for the express purpose of establishing her authority over the translations of 
the Hebrew from this passage of Joshua. The basis for her first argument for the 
Copernican system rests upon the Buck’s marginalia. In the Buck, she notes, there is 
included “an Asterism at the Word stand, and renders it in the Margent, from the Hebrew, 
Be thou silent: If it be so in the Hebrew, be thou silent makes as much for the Motion of 
the Earth, according to Copernicus, as for the Motion of the Sun according to Ptolemy” 
(“Essay” 83). In opening her argument by seeding doubt in the Biblical edition that both 
Tacquet and Galileo use, she continues to proclaim her authority in textual scholarship. 
This structural decision provides the prowess for her to demonstrate the very 
astronomical knowledge that she promises she will not employ in the opening passage.  
Yet, Behn’s discussion of the Buck text does not cease there. Though her 
reasoning is somewhat varied from Galileo, she arrives at a similar conclusion to her 
Copernican predecessor. Both Behn and Galileo decide that, in order for the cessation of 
the sun to have happened, a sort of change in cosmic time must have occurred. Under the 
heliocentric model, because the sun stands still, all planets move according the pull of the 
central sun. Galileo concludes, “Upon [the sun’s] stopping all other revolutions ceased,” 
and thus time itself stood still for a moment (Galileo 213). Unlike Galileo, Behn, in her 
conclusion, stresses the impetus of God in this occurrence. She declares, “I doubt not but 
when this stupendious Miracle was performed by the Almighty and Infinite Power of 
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God, his omnipotent Arm did in an instant stop the Course of Nature, and the whole 
Frame of the Universe was at a stand” (“Essay” 84). Behn’s invocation of God and 
reinstitution of the miraculous is perhaps a coverup for her larger argument, which indeed 
stresses the agency of Nature and not God in the course of this phenomenon.  
In contrast, Galileo’s argument rests on the idea that either the sun would have 
had to stop entirely or the earth would have had to “accelerat[ed] the customary speed of 
the sun about three hundred sixty times” (213). This understanding forefronts a divine 
agent without necessarily naming one, and as such, Galileo does not subtract the power 
from Joshua as translator or God as miracle worker. Behn’s text questions the ways in 
which nature might have set the diurnal course in such a way that it caused a natural 
phenomenon. Indeed, Behn ends up concluding that this occurrence must have been like 
an “Eclipse of the Sun and Moon, which are now so regular, that an Astronomer could 
tell you to a Minute, what Eclipses will be for thousands of Years to come” (“Essay” 84). 
Behn stresses that it must have been a sight that was awe-inspiring to societies who did 
not have the technology nor scientific principles to understand what the event was. Thus, 
the miracle, Behn appears to imply, would have been a form of divine accommodation 
itself—a miracle designed for the minds of the early Israelites and not one that would 
impress an audience of seventeenth-century Europeans.  
Much like Galileo’s, Behn’s analysis details the catastrophic effect such an 
astronomical shift would have upon the earth. Behn suggests that this event could not 
have been as miraculous as the Israelites perceived but rather a natural phenomenon. 
Behn’s argument deduces that “nothing less than two or three new Miracles, all as great 
as the first, could have set the World in Order again” (“Essay” 84). Behn’s conclusion 
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varies from Galileo’s in regards to the geological and cosmological implications of such 
an event and suggests that she was not just comprehending Copernican theory from 
Galileo’s letter secondhand but generating her own conclusions.  
As a clearly contrasting bookend to her earlier assertions that she will not enter 
the discussion of mathematics and troublesome theology because of her inferior 
educational status as a woman, Behn claims a space for herself in the very realm she has 
promised to avoid. After her detailed and deeply concerted effort in the realm of 
geometry, translation, and astronomy, Behn concludes by expressing her opinion on the 
relationship between scientific discovery and Biblical understanding:  
I think it is the Duty of all good Christians to acquiesce in the Opinion and 
Decrees of  
the Church of Christ, in whom dwells the Spirit of God, which enlightens us to 
Matters of Religion and Faith; and as to other things contained in the Holy 
Scriptures relating to Astronomy, Geometry, Chronology, and other liberal 
Sciences, we leave those Points to the Opinion of the Learned. (“Essay” 85)  
This claim is extraordinary in that Behn seems to have firmly placed her essay within the 
“Opinion of the Learned”. To those that would oppose her, she shows herself ready to 
challenge, reconstitute, and belittle their arguments. In regards to her readings of the 
Scriptures, Behn concludes that others “keep close to the Literal Sense, and others give 
the Word of God only that Meaning or Sense that pleases their own Humours” (85). 
Indeed, she assures that nothing she has argued in the text has come from anything “but 
from good Authority”, that being, largely, her own studies, readings, and mathematical 
observations (85). Thus, Behn creates in her “Essay on Translated Prose” a mechanism 
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by which she can promote herself as an excellent translator and subvert the low 
expectations of her mathematical and theological capacities. In this way, she acts as one 
in close conversation with the male thinkers of the seventeenth century in a manner that 
is both self-promoting and confidently articulated.  
 
Self-Promotion and Satire in Behn’s “A Letter to Mr. Creech”  
 Though Behn encourages an understanding of herself as a public intellectual, 
much of this self-fashioning is cast in a carefully feminized frame. Behn commends and 
deconstructs male contemporaries’ arguments but rarely viscerally attacks them on the 
grounds of their own treatment of her work. Though less frequently than her male 
contemporaries, Behn proves herself highly capable of criticizing even the greatest 
authors of her time. Her scathing ridicule of John Dryden in her poem “A Satyr on 
Doctor Dryden” provides an example of Behn unfiltered. She bemoans his late-in-life 
conversion to Catholicism as a senile and anti-Christian act. She complains, “[A]las how 
leering Hereticks will laugh / to see a grey old hedge bird caught with chaffe / a lewd old 
Atheist some religion owne” (“A Satyr” 5-7). While her critique of Dryden is offered 
from the position of a distant observer, her disgruntlement towards Thomas Creech in “A 
Letter to the Mr. Creech” provides insight into her own frustration about intimate 
criticisms against her.  
 As already noted, Behn proved herself less than happy about the edits made to her 
poem praising Creech’s translation of Lucretius. That she published her original version 
just two years later in her own poetry compilation and complained to Tonson, her 
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publisher, is evidence enough.39 However, a year after Behn produced Poems Upon 
Several Occassions (1684), she edited a small book of poetry entitled Miscellany (1685). 
Included in this text is Behn’s sendup of Thomas Creech, entitled “A Letter to Mr. 
Creech at Oxford, Written in the last great Frost”. Rife with obscurely topical allusions, 
hyperbole, and jagged rhyme schemes, this poem is imbedded in the satirical tradition 
named after Samuel Butler’s mock epic poem, Hudibras.40 Behn’s venture into this style 
of jabbing humor is a marked departure from her usually strict pentameter couplets. Behn 
does not shy away from the rough nature of Butler’s infamous verse. Her tone is thus 
harsh and unpleasant, as when she sarcastically closes the poem prior to her postmark: 
“So Sir with Recommendents fervent, / I rest your very humble Servant” (“A Letter” 82-
83).  
 This stylistic decision implies Behn’s frustration with her constant portrayal as a 
bawdy playwright and with her exclusion from the realm of serious thinkers. However, 
the Hudibrastic style was not one that was necessarily considered unskilled. Particularly 
with the rise of irreverence in British texts in the aftermath of the Civil War, Butler’s 
terse diction and unsatisfactory double rhymes were imitated frequently in the eighteenth 
century. Literary historian Richard Terry demonstrates that there was a highly 
contentious relationship among English poets on the value of this poetic form. Terry 
argues that Hudibras’ “reputation was damaged by the near-relation in which it stood to 
                                                          
39 Shortly after Creech’s success with his translation of Lucretius, Behn would write to 
Jacob Tonson, her publisher, “As for Mr. Creech…never let him know my resentment” 
(“Letter to Tonson” 481). 
40 The original publication history of Hudibras spans from 1663-1684. Though parts of 
the epic poem were published sporadically from 1663-1678, the complete text was 
published finally in 1684. Perhaps, Behn was inspired by the cumulative text and 
responded to its continued popularity with her own venture into the style.  
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the English travesty” (Terry III).  Travesty was the rising tradition of parodying classical 
texts, such as Cotton’s Scarronides and later Pope’s The Rape of the Lock. Reception of 
these mock heroics varied wildly, but it was agreed that the style was a departure from 
the high-brow classics.  
Crucially for Behn, the Hudibrastic style was a libertine vehicle for mocking 
something rather serious. Just as fellow male poets seriously critique conservative politics 
with Hudibras as a guide, Behn deftly wields this libertine tool to show the 
conservativeness of those within this intellectual community who exclude her. Creech’s 
edit of her poem is a trigger point to identify her broader exclusion from the community 
and also name the inherent hypocrisy in such a group. If Behn’s idea of a libertinism is 
that which seriously considers all types of thought, then their dismissal of her 
philosophical opinions unveils flaws within their own brand of thinking.  Indeed, her tone 
is one of deep-seated anger. She tells Creech that in his treatment of her poem, “the 
disappointment was all mine” (“A Letter” 79). Thus, Behn’s choice of form functions in 
two crucial ways: Firstly, by writing in a style so divergent from her typical fare, she 
demonstrates the differences between traditionally “low-brow” satirical writing and her 
other poems. When she finally plays into critics’ stereotypes of her, she is able to reveal 
how such tropes are inaccurate. Secondly, the style offers Behn a chance to use a libertine 
tool to demonstrate inherent libertine flaws.  
Though her style and tone are satirical, Behn rather seriously portrays her literary-
intellectual resume. She demonstrates her vast influence through the poem’s journey 
through the streets of London. Behn moves about the city with her coach and 
coachman—an obvious exaggeration of her wealth as she had well-publicized financial 
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struggles particularly at the end of her life. Her connection to these places not only 
characterizes the vast amount of work that she did throughout her career, but also makes 
fun of those who critique her work no matter in what context she writes. Crucially, she 
begins at Jacob Tonson’s publishing house where she has left a letter to Creech urging 
him to recall her other poem written for him. Though this poem is rarely referenced in 
discussions of “To the Unknown Daphnis”, “A Letter to Mr. Creech” is fairly plain in 
connecting Behn’s frustration as stemming from his editorial treatment of the Lucretian 
poem. She draws attention to it as her avatar in the poem metaphorically leaves this poem 
for him at his and her old publisher. She reminds him, “You shou’d have had a scrap of 
Nonsense / You may remember left at the Tonsons” (“A Letter” 4-5). She once again 
recalls his treatment of her text when she describes his “Scribling Fist was out of joynt / 
And ev’ry Limb made great complaint” (41-42). Her choice to set the opening of the 
poem at the Tonson’s publishing house (a publisher that she left later in life due to 
financial limitations on her work) suggests a double source of betrayal. Tonson restricted 
her financially and allowed the mangled edition of her poem to be published allegedly 
without her knowledge, and Creech misrepresented her mode of freethought.  
Indeed, Behn suggests that Creech’s de-radicalization of her Epicurean 
viewpoints was rather demoralizing to her status as a public intellectual. She complains 
that his edits were “missing the dear Assignation, / [and] Gave [her] most cause of 
Tribulation” (“A Letter” 43-44). She goes on to suggest that she, had he been favorable to 
her text, would have introduced him to an influential Londoner—her late-in-life friend 
John Hoyle. Hoyle was a lawyer and close confidante to Behn during the 1680s, as she 
references him throughout much of her poetry (Todd 410). Hoyle qualifies to be a 
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colleague of Creech’s because Behn describes him as “A great Admirer of Lucretius” 
(“Letter” 48). As such, Behn establishes her design for an intellectual network that never 
was fulfilled—a relationship between three Lucretian thinkers with Creech playing the 
part of a phony.  
 In these moments in which Behn names her exclusion, her mood rather 
dramatically swings from satirical to somber. Perhaps the most powerful instance of this 
tonal shift is when Behn mourns the intellectual community she felt was so elusive. She 
despairs: 
But transitory hopes do vary,  
And high Designments oft miscarry, 
Ambition never climb’d so lofty,  
But may descent too fair and softly. (49-52) 
Indeed, Behn pauses her Hudibrastic voice numerous times to draw attention to 
the seriousness of her exclusion from the intellectual literary community. Many of her 
allusions in this text draw upon somber notions of segregations and comparisons between 
genders. In one such section, she parallels her wit to that of neoclassical poets and 
Dryden. She claims that she seeks wit that will “charm” and “instruct”—a famous 
sentiment echoed by Horace and Aristotle and frequently supported by poets such as Sir 
Phillip Sidney and Ben Jonson (“A Letter” 18-19). Furthermore, she claims that this 
moral center and “Wit, like Bays” are her “Tryal” (20-21). “Bays” was a common 
nickname for John Dryden during his career, in reference to the leaves that made up his 
laureate crown. That Behn draws attention to Jonson, Sidney, Dryden, and the ancient 
poets in this one section and then declares in frustration that reaching these masculine 
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standards “’twas most impossible” demonstrates Behn’s true exclusion from the realm of 
masculine esteem in the literary intellectual community (22). Moreover, her choice to not 
name these men but identify them by the standards and accolades that they received takes 
the agency from the poets themselves and places it onto those that seek to canonize such 
standards and writers. Thus, Behn insinuates that it is not for lack of skill that she cannot 
achieve the rank of these men, but for lack of proper recognition from the literary 
community at large.  
This theme is further emphasized by Behn’s literary allusions. She makes a farce 
of her connection to Creech by mockingly calling both this poem and her commendatory 
poem of his Lucretius translation a “Billet Deux”, an intentionally butchered spelling, as 
Janet Todd notes, of the French term for a love letter (Todd 409). Furthermore, as she 
journeys, she passes “that Place of Fame call’d Temple” (“Letter” 36). This reference 
most clearly alludes to the judiciary buildings of the law school in London (called the 
Inns of Court), where many famous wealthy men studied law while developing specific 
styles of poetry that were often popularized and lauded by the literary community.  
However, Behn could also be speaking of the Chaucer poem “The House of 
Fame”. In this dream poem, the poet explores a temple in which an eagle operates as a 
guide for meditation on why certain writers are famous and on what constitutes fame. 
Behn, if not referencing this directly, is certainly working with similar concepts, 
specifically as they relate to why she as a poet is excluded from the same fame and 
recognition as that of her peers.41 Thus, this allusion works on multiple levels. The Inns 
                                                          
41 As Behn’s work indicates, she was closely attune to many of the rising literary and 
philosophical trends to follow shortly after her time. Such contemplations of the nature of 
fame would become greatly popularized in the eighteenth century. For example, Pope 
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of Court was a breeding ground for respected intellectuals and poets and, as such, a 
breeding ground for fame. The nature of fame in the intellectual community is thus bound 
up in contemplations of prejudice, as in Chaucer’s text. Behn’s melding together of these 
two concepts suggests that she understands the nature of fame as British intellectual 
circles would have it. English literary fame is concerned not with skill but with gender, 
class, and social connections.  
Indeed, the Inns of Court loom over Behn’s failure to enter the dynamic 
philosophical conversations of the day. Creech’s attendance in another exclusively male 
institution, Wadham College, provides a personally painful foundation for her to explain 
such groups. The educational system once so greatly lauded by her in “To the Unknown 
Daphnis” transforms into the object of her scorn, as she describes the university as 
“Where Colledg dunce is cur’d of Simple, / Against that Sign of Whore call’d Scarlet” 
(“Letter” 38-39). Once again, Behn’s double entendre preys upon the spoiled nature 
teenagers entering the universities and the Inns of Court. The “Sign of Whore” was both 
in reference to the name of a tavern in London and potentially the “sign” of venereal 
diseases. Creech’s stiffness in regards to his interpretation of Behn’s Lucretian poem is 
weighed against this image of the partying college student. She is clearly angered by the 
hypocrisy. Creech’s betrayal is portrayed beyond the ignorance of a “Colledg Dunce” but 
compared to the Whig faction that rebelled against the monarchy. Her association with 
those “cheated” by the “sawcy Whigg[s]” closely represents Behn’s own exclusion from 
Creech’s freethinking circle (64, 55). She follows her ultimate symbol of betrayal with 
                                                          
reworked Chaucer’s “The House of Fame” to “The Temple of Fame” in 1715, and 
Thomas Gray’s vastly canonized “Elegy written in a Country Churchyard” would 
articulate these same emotions even more clearly in 1750.  
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her explication of his treatment towards her: “Thus you by fate (to me, Sinister), / At 
Shop of Book my Billet mist Sir” (71-72). Thus, she demands his recognition of his 
mistreatment of her public persona and personal profitability.  
She further characterizes Creech’s betrayal of her work by comparing his editorial 
intervention to that of Lazarillo de Tormes. She writes of someone looking at her as 
though she appears like “Lazarello who was show’d / For a strange Fish, to’th’ gaping 
Crowd” (“Letter” 69-70). Lazarillo de Tormes was a famous Spanish picaresque novel 
written by an anonymous source in the mid-sixteenth century. The story was wildly 
popular and rewritten as a sequel by Juan Luna in the 1620s. In Luna’s version of the 
second act of the story, Lazarillo is captured by seamen and is thought to be a sea 
monster. As such, the seamen decide to make profit off him as a showcase. In the 
original, Lazarillo is truly a fish, but in Luna’s later edition, Lazarillo, once discovered by 
the seamen to be a real man, is dressed to look like a fish and still placed in a cage. That 
Behn connects to Lazarillo, the man dressed up as a spectacle despite his true nature, 
demonstrates Behn’s hostility towards her critical treatment. Just as Creech presents her 
work on Lucretius as something other than her version of Epicureanism, her critics 
publicize her as something other than she intended. It is when she returns home that she 
refers to the fish. As she turns inward and out of the public eye, she makes an interesting 
observation: that she has not seen “Daphnis ere he went” because she is “sure his grief is 
beyond expressing” for what he did to her (“Letter” 75). The moment is striking in that it 
serves as a call to action for Creech. Even though Behn has rhetorically stripped him 
down, she still seeks both his apology and his invitation into his intellectual circle. 
Lesley 95 
 
Behn’s postscript, however, suggests that she does not expect Creech to follow 
through on the offer. She turns again to her comedic and witty side to point to other 
notable intellectuals with whom she wishes to converse. She recalls a party during which 
she met his friend “a Man of Wit / A man whom I shall ne’re forget” (“Letter” 86-87). 
Behn attempts to make Creech intellectually jealous by showcasing her interest in another 
male philosopher. She goes over and beyond necessary compliments for the man and 
even begs Creech to introduce them, as though bragging that she still has interest from 
others to join their intellectual networks. She praises this man as she calls him:  
True Tory all! and when he spoke,  
A God in Wit, tho Man in look.  
--To this your Friend—Daphnis address 
The humblest of my Services;  
Tell him how much—yet do not too,  
My vast esteem no words can shew;  
Tell him—that he is worthy—you. (90-96) 
Her repartee in this section is clear. In this moment, she establishes a sense not only that 
she does not need Creech’s approval to enter the intellectual conversation but also that 
she will move upward by her introduction to the anonymous man. Her refusal to name the 
man translates romantic and sexual tropes onto the realm of intellectual stimulation. 
Behn’s keen insight into her own public persona as a romantic and sexual libertine allows 
her to play with the same themes of courtship, jealousy, and cheating. This framework is 
transplanted onto that which she seems much more interested in discussing—intellectual 
collateral and connections in the British philosophical community.  
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Thus, Behn’s attempts at establishing an intellectual literary network are closely 
intertwined thematically with Behn’s mockery of typical criticisms of her work. The only 
other text that perhaps more directly addresses her gendered criticism is in her preface to 
her play The Luckey Chance. In that work, she decries those that would say that her work 
is too bawdy. Indeed, the same such jokes and scenes “are never taken Notice of, because 
a Man writ them, and they may hear that from them they blush at from a Woman” 
(Luckey Chance). As she notes, critics, due to her status as a female professional writer, 
conflated her gendered identity with the bold content of her work. Unlike in The Luckey 
Chance, her satire of Creech plays into such stereotypes:  
But you may think I was in Wine then;  
Because it being cold, you know  
We warm’d it with a Glass—or so,… 
But when ‘twixt every sparkling Cup,  
 I so much brisker Wit took up;  
 Wit, able to inspire a thinking. (“A Letter” 9-11, 14-16)  
Instances of such ironic self-deprecation are flooded throughout the text. She even calls 
her rhymes “scurvy” (6).  
Importantly, she sets her drunken writing within the context of the “last great 
Frost”. The Great Frost is in reference to the 1683-1684 freeze of the Thames River. 
During winters in which the Thames would freeze (this occurred and was celebrated 
several times throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century), there would be a sort of 
city-wide party in the form of a fair that was set up in and around the iced-over Thames. 
As reputations of English fairs in the sixteenth and seventeenth century go, such events 
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were often marked by lewdness, drunkenness, and sexual debauchery.42 Behn, perhaps, is 
mocking her sexual and bombastic reputation by pointedly observing the time frame in 
and event during which she wrote. The fair, she seems to suggest, is to blame for her 
rather crude poem. She recalls the caricatures drawn of herself that would suggest that 
she is the type of woman who would enjoy the fair—as bawdy, rude, and drunken.  
 Though Behn’s poem is one marked with humor, there is also a deep interplay 
between audience expectation and her own personal projection of self. Because of this 
dichotomy, “A Letter to Mr. Creech” is one of her most haunting poems. There is a sense, 
as she tours through London later in her life, that she cannot escape her reputation nor 
enter the conversations she wishes. Creech’s treatment of her foray into the libertine is 
perhaps the most palpable example of such a shunning and thus produces the most 
palpable response. Even when Behn passes by Whitehall, she stresses her lack of 
payment and her submissive position to write for pay. She characterizes her old 
relationship with Charles II, who has recently died, as one of debt for propaganda: “His 
Sacred Majesty from Dunning; / Who oft in Debt is, truth to tell, / For Tory Farce, or 
Doggerell” (“A Letter” 27-29). A woman famously known for her lack of biography, 
Behn provides a poem that is overlooked in scholarly attempts to understand how she 
viewed herself in the larger seventeenth-century intellectual and literary circles. Though 
her preface to The Luckey Chance is often cited for her plea for her audience to enjoy her 
play as they would a man’s, “A Letter to Mr. Creech” suggests a much more personal 
interaction of exclusion and prejudice—one that is not centered on audience perception 
                                                          
42 The most famous literary exploration of such events occurs in Ben Jonson’s 
Bartholomew’s Fair in which he portrays moral depravity and hypersexuality of women 
throughout the course of the fair.  
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but peer perception. Her passage through male-dominated spaces of publishing, court life, 
collegiate campuses, and political strife emphasizes Behn as a close observer of but also a 
distant engager with the most crucial aspects of intellectual production in England.  
  
Conclusion 
 Behn rightly perceived her distance from such freethinking spaces; however, this 
does not mean that Behn herself was not, by her prolific career later in life, infiltrating the 
intellectual discussions of the 1680s and onward. Whether welcomed or not, Behn made 
herself a writer with whom her contemporaries and later critics must deal and study. 
From Creech’s hesitant insistence on employing Behn’s praise of his translation to 
Collins’ serious inclusion of Behn as a libertine in his Discourse of Freethinking, she was 
regarded by her contemporaries as someone to be discussed. Her own invasions of the 
intellectual world in “Essay on Translated Prose” and Oroonoko were made impossible to 
ignore by their sheer novelty—of Oroonoko as one of the first English novellas and of 
“Essay on Translated Prose” as one of the first serious inquiries on the nature of English 
translational prose. Her writing demanded attention. Whether she was respected or not, 
she was someone that was in fact heard. Traces of her are hard to escape throughout 
eighteenth century literary histories or even in the work and correspondences of writers 
like Dryden, Rochester, Creech, and so forth.  
 Certainly, Behn was noticed because she was one of the female exceptions. She 
was exceptional in that she supported herself by her pen, and she was exceptional in that, 
while often permitting herself to fall into the literary tropes of women writing, she 
demanded equal attention, respect, and pay. Ever since Virginia Woolf asked all women 
Lesley 99 
 
who wrote to thank Aphra Behn for their right to do so, scholars have never been able to 
disentangle Behn’s literary center from her gender (A Room of One’s Own 48). This is 
not to say that Behn should not be read as a woman—that she was a woman writer cannot 
be omitted from an analysis of a writer constantly reminded that she was the other and 
thus unwelcome.  
However, much of what Behn says in regards to sex is to wish away the centrality 
of her gendered identity so that she can be heard for what she truly wants to speak about. 
Gender is the rhetorical hurdle she must jump over before she gets to the heart of her 
discussion. In all four of these texts studied, Behn’s engagement with her sex is so that 
she can get past it—so that she can enter the realm of libertinism that engages with many 
worlds theory, Biblical accommodationist theory, Copernican theory, Lucretian and 
Epicurean thought, and, above all, rational religious doubt. To study Behn as a forerunner 
for women’s writing allowed the writer to emerge into the evolving seventeenth century 
literary canon; to read Behn as a woman is a necessary step to remove the veil by which 
she shrouded all her works. To only highlight Behn as a sexual and gendered libertine, 
however, would be to limit her to the same literary historical reading that her 
contemporaries and critics gave her up to the present day.  
What was Behn trying to say that her gendered public perception and persona 
would not permit her? As has been demonstrated throughout this essay, Aphra Behn’s 
work was deeply imbedded within a larger, highly masculinized discussion of fluctuating 
freethought. To successfully infiltrate these discourses required an understanding of 
Biblical history, church oppression, shifting scientific principles, and the conversation 
swirling around such issues in her day. As Oroonoko, “To the Unknown Daphnis, “A 
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Letter to Mr. Creech”, and “An Essay on Translated Prose” all demonstrate, Behn was an 
active and crucial participant in such discussions. Hopefully, she will be considered as 
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